Trinitarian Theorizing and Mystery as a Way Forward: A Critical Examination of the Forms of Trinitarian Hypothesizing, Why They Fail, and Why Mystery is a Way Forward by Conniry, Matthew J.
Digital Commons @ George Fox University
Seminary Masters Theses Seminary
3-1-2014
Trinitarian Theorizing and Mystery as a Way
Forward: A Critical Examination of the Forms of
Trinitarian Hypothesizing, Why They Fail, and
Why Mystery is a Way Forward
Matthew J. Conniry
George Fox University, mconniry05@georgefox.edu
This research is a product of the Master of Arts in Theological Studies (MATS) program at George Fox
University. Find out more about the program.
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Seminary at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Seminary Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University.
Recommended Citation
Conniry, Matthew J., "Trinitarian Theorizing and Mystery as a Way Forward: A Critical Examination of the Forms of Trinitarian
Hypothesizing, Why They Fail, and Why Mystery is a Way Forward" (2014). Seminary Masters Theses. Paper 13.
http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/seminary_masters/13
 
 
GEORGE FOX UNIVERSITY 
 
TRINITARIAN THEORIZING AND MYSTERY AS A WAY FORWARD: 
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE FORMS OF TRINITARIAN HYPOTHESIZING, 
WHY THEY FAIL, AND WHY MYSTERY IS A WAY FORWARD 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GEORGE FOX SEMINARY IN 
CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 
 
BY 
MATTHEW J. CONNIRY 
 
NEWBERG, OREGON 
March 2014 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2014 by Matthew J. Conniry 
All rights reserved 

 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Scholarship reveals that there are at least two primary ways of handling the issue 
incumbent within Trinitarian theorizing. Most theologians resolve the issue by addressing the 
inconsistencies, finding various ways to make important distinctions to eliminate apparent 
contradictions. This is no doubt the most popular route. Among these are social Trinitarians and 
Latin Trinitarians. A rough distinction can be made here, wherein social Trinitarians start with 
the Threeness of God and reason from that stance that God is one by an inexorable and eternal 
loving relationship. Oppositely, Latin Trinitarians start with God as one and reason how God can 
possibly be three. These approaches will be discussed here because they share the foundational 
quality of wanting to satisfy human reason while remaining orthodox. Lastly, there is 
Mysterianism, which is considered a meta-theory insofar as it purports to say something about all 
other theories, but is also a theory in its own right. Mysterianism comes in two distinct forms, 
positive and negative. Negative forms of Mysterianism maintain that we simply have insufficient 
intelligible content to determine whether Trinitarian belief is either consistent or inconsistent. 
That is to say, the information provided is either too scarce or itself too unfathomable to form a 
theory that can be toiled with and tried by human reason. Conversely, positive Mysterianism 
asserts that mystery is not the result of too little content, but rather an abundance of it. The 
human mind can entertain and even understand many divine truths, but sometimes the 
conjunction of those truths is seemingly rationally inconsistent. As such, it is not the content 
itself that is unintelligible, but the combination of such content that becomes increasingly 
unfathomable. The positive Mysterian says that since we have sufficient plantingian-like warrant 
for believing certain individual propositions about God’s nature, we have sufficient warrant for 
rationally holding them conjointly despite their seeming contradiction.  
 The benefits of this study are that it takes seriously the call of Peter to have reasons for 
the hope that is within you and it also gives modern-day Christians recourse to reject many 
modern-day conclusions that make God bow to reason and not reason to God. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 
 
Long have the bearers of Christendom attempted to discern the deeper mysteries of God. 
The early church—content as it was to let mystery fill in the gaps of God’s unfathomable 
enormity—left for posterity creeds and canons that contemporary theologians and philosophers 
now toil to explicate. Perhaps the deepest of all the mysteries passed down through the centuries 
is that of God’s triune nature—God as Trinity.  
But as a people we have become increasingly accustomed to unraveling the mysteries of 
the universe, where we once left mystery to the works of some distant pantheon, we now relish 
in the precision of the cold and calculated hand of science and reason. Mystery must go the way 
of Zeus and Jupiter, and make way for an epistemic imperialism that has charted the stars, 
dissected the atom, and now, as it seems, explained the Trinity. Herein lies the problem. No 
epistemic formulae are sufficient in providing adequate explications of the Trinity. This thesis 
intends to address this problem, paying special attention to modern approaches to resolve the 
incumbent issues of the Trinity, and argue that mystery is the only reliable way beyond the 
conspicuous absence of formulaic expressions of the Trinity. 
In an article published by the Religious Studies journal out of Cambridge University 
Press, Dale Tuggy, a philosopher of religion who teaches at SUNY Fredonia, argues with 
formidable clarity that the two most distinguished approaches to understanding the Trinity, both 
Social and Latin Trinitarianism, fail to surmount important logical and biblical conditions. Tuggy
2 
 
 
also sharply criticizes the appeal to “mystery,” suggesting that such an appeal in the face of 
apparent contradiction pushes the boundaries of rational and theological credulity. As such, 
Tuggy argues that the project of Trinitarian theorizing is unsatisfactorily unfinished.
1
 
In order to illustrate the precise shortcomings of any given Trinity theory, Tuggy offers 
six propositions, any subset of which is used by many Trinitarian theories to systemically 
explicate the nature of the Trinity. These propositions are as follows: 
(1) God is divine. 
(2) The Father of Jesus Christ is divine. 
(3) The Son, Jesus Christ, is divine. 
(4) The Holy Spirit is divine. 
(5) The Father is not the Son is not the Holy Spirit is not God. That is, these four—
Father, Son, Holy Spirit, God are numerically distinct individuals. 
(6) Whatever is divine is identical to at least one of these: the Father, the Son, or the Holy 
Spirit. 
In addition, Tuggy rightfully divides (5) into separate propositional claims: 
(5a) These three are numerically distinct: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
(5b) God is numerically distinct from any of these: Father, Son, Holy Spirit. 
  
As is perhaps already obvious, these propositions are redolent within many of the most 
familiar formulations of the Trinity. The Athanasian creed for instance, most likely penned in the 
5
th
 century some 100 years after Athanasius’ death, professes the Trinity with its first 28 lines. In 
this early creedal manifesto, the claims (1)-(4) and (5a) are prominently expressed. The creed 
professes: 
And yet they are not three Almighties; but one Almighty. So the Father is God; 
the Son is God; and the Holy Ghost is God. And yet they are not three Gods; but 
                                                          
 
1
 Dale Tuggy, "The Unfinished Business of Trinitarian Theorizing," Religious Studies 39, 
no. 02 (2003): 165-183. 
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one God. So likewise the Father is Lord; the Son Lord; and the Holy Ghost Lord. 
And yet not three Lords; but one Lord.
2
 
The only proposition that the Trinitarian theologian is welcome to reject without 
trespassing Orthodoxy is (5b), inasmuch as the claim, though perhaps utilized in some 
Trinitarian theorizing, is not itself a biblical claim. Tuggy himself seems to lean towards a 
rejection of (5b) and a solution that creates an identity relationship between God and the Father 
exclusively, saying, “Many careful readers have noticed that in the New Testament ‘God’ and 
‘the Father’ are almost always two names for one thing. They are used more or less 
interchangeably.” Accordingly, this would seem to present a rather simple solution to the 
problem as Tuggy has represented it.  The only genuine danger here is not that any of these 
propositions are false, save (5b) perhaps, but that we may be want to artificially limit our 
theorizing only to this set of propositions. This is why James Anderson, a professor of theology 
and philosophy at Reformed Theology Seminary, in his response to Tuggy’s critique, offers to 
solidify Tuggy’s unstated biblical datum by way of the additional proposition: 
(7) The Father of Jesus Christ is identical to God. 
Tuggy is certainly right that the Bible is rife with verses that seem to indicate a numerical 
equivalency between the Father and God. Consider the author of the book of John’s statement in 
John 6:45 (cf. 1 Corinthians 8:6): 
It is written in the prophets, ‘and they shall all be taught of God.’ Everyone who has 
heard and learned from the Father, comes to Me.
3
 
 
But this single additional proposition leaves the equation still somewhat wanting, causing the 
careful reader to question why our early Christian forebears found it necessary to affirm with 
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  P. Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom: With a History and Critical Notes (Harper, 
1877), 96-99. 
 
3
 Jn 6:45 (New American Standard Bible). 
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such doctrinal ferocity the reality of the Trinity in a way that claims more than Tuggy’s 
premises, claiming more than just the divinity of Jesus or the Holy Spirit. Thus, Tuggy’s listed 
premises are disingenuous to exclude with reticent oversight the additional proposition that has 
long been affirmed in the History of Christian orthodoxy and its many creeds, namely 
Anderson’s other helpful propositional addition: 
(8) The Son, Jesus Christ, is identical to God. 
Tuggy’s omission of this proposition cannot be due to lack of biblical warrant, though one may 
be led to believe that is precisely Tuggy’s belief, in that he maintains that the name “God” in 
referential use to any entity other than the Father “isn’t a name for the individual Yahweh, but is 
rather a descriptive term like ‘divine,’ which says something about what sort of being the son 
is.”4 This would be all well and good if it were not for the preponderance of biblical data that 
seems to affront Tuggy’s extenuating reasons for omitting (8). For instance, Matthew 3:3 and 
Mark 1:3 refer to John the Baptist as the prophetic embodiment of Isaiah 40:3, wherein John is 
the person to prepare the way of Yahweh. Of course, John the Baptist did not prepare the way for 
the Father but for Jesus Christ (unless one is willing to do some hermeneutical gymnastics). 
Similarly, Jesus, in John 8:58, identifies himself with God’s self-disclosed identity in Exodus 
3:14, claiming to be nontemporally bound using such similar phraseology that the connection can 
hardly be reasonably denied.
5
 Moreover, the author of the Gospel of John stated in no uncertain 
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 Tuggy, "The Unfinished Business of Trinitarian Theorizing," 169. 
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 For further exposition of this point see: M.J. Harris, Jesus as God: The New Testament 
Use of Theos in Reference to Jesus (Baker Publishing Group, 1992); R. Swinburne, Was Jesus 
God? (OUP Oxford, 2008); J.F. Walvoord, Jesus Christ Our Lord (Moody Publishers, 1969); M. 
Endo, Creation and Christology: A Study on the Johannine Prologue in the Light of Early Jewish 
Creation Accounts (Mohr Seibeck, 2002). 
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terms that the image Isaiah saw of Yahweh’s glory in Isaiah 6 was “Jesus’ Glory.”6  Also, Jesus 
is identified as the “living stone” in 1 Peter 2:4: “As you come to him, the living Stone—rejected 
by humans but chosen by God and precious to him,” (NIV). As mentioned before, this parallels 
Isaiah 8:13-14, 
The LORD Almighty is the one you are to regard as holy, 
    he is the one you are to fear, 
    he is the one you are to dread. 
 
He will be a holy place; 
    for both Israel and Judah he will be 
a stone that causes people to stumble 
    and a rock that makes them fall. 
And for the people of Jerusalem he will be 
    a trap and a snare. 
 
Isaiah states that Yahweh is the stone that will cause people to stumble, where it is Jesus in 1 
Peter 2:8 who is said to be that very same thing according to the same scripture.
7
 It follows, 
Anderson notes, that there is a very strong numerical identity at work in the Scripture with regard 
to Jesus and God such that we must conclude that they are indeed coreferential. While Anderson 
uses more scriptural justification to establish reasonable grounds to conclude the numerical 
equivalency of Jesus and God, and still others have written volumes, it should at this point be 
clear that our forebears were not too hasty in contending that (8) is, indeed, a valid biblical 
proposition. 
 Because of Tuggy’s oversights with regard to important biblical propositions that should 
be considered in any work of Trinitarian theorizing, this paper has opted to use Tuggy’s premises 
with the addition of Anderson’s premises as a means of inquiry into the problems of Trinitarian 
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 Jn 12:41 (New International Version) 
 
7
 “and, ‘A stone that causes people to stumble and a rock that makes them fall.’ They 
stumble because they disobey the message—which is also what they were destined for.” 1 Pt. 
2:8. 
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theorizing and why an appeal to mystery may really be the best option available. The whole set 
of propositional claims that this paper will take as the best representation of Trinitarian 
orthodoxy is as follows:  
(1) God is divine. 
(2) The Father of Jesus Christ is divine. 
(3) The Son, Jesus Christ, is divine. 
(4) The Holy Spirit is divine. 
(5a) These three are numerically distinct: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
(6) Whatever is divine is identical to at least one of these: the Father, the Son, or the Holy 
Spirit.
8
 
(7) The Father of Jesus Christ is identical to God. 
(8) The Son, Jesus Christ, is identical to God. 
(9) The Holy Spirit is identical to God. 
(10) There is one divine being.
9
 
 
The last two propositional claims have not yet been discussed but they are equally clear from 
Trinitarian history to be central claims to Latin or traditional Trinitarianism. Before moving 
forward, I will briefly discuss their biblical value.  
 It may already be abundantly clear that Tuggy’s original formulation is a bit premature, 
insofar as it omits some foundational biblical claims that prove to be central to many Trinitarian 
theories. At the outset of his criticism of Trinitirian theories, Tuggy suggests that there exists an 
endemic threefold problem for bygone and contemporary theories of the Trinity. These problems 
arise over issues of consistency, intelligibility, and biblical soundness. As is perhaps evident, 
these issues look increasingly daunting and perhaps impossible to surmount when the latter 
additional premises are compounded with Tuggy’s original six.  But as already shown for (7) and 
(8), the addition of these premises is not only prudent, but necessary if we are to take seriously a 
commitment to biblical soundness.  Though the last two propositions (9) and (10) are not needed 
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9
 James Anderson, "In Defence of Mystery: A Reply to Dale Tuggy," Religious Studies 
41, no. 02 (2005): 146-147. 
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to increase the level of logical confusion any more than (8) and (9) already have, they are 
necessary nonetheless. It seems that Scripture does have something to say about the actual deity 
of the Holy Spirit. For instance, Acts 5:3-4 is typically considered among the best proof texts for 
this claim, inasmuch as the author of Acts recounts Peter telling Ananias that by having lied to 
the Holy Spirit he has lied to God. Thus, a similar coreferential relationship that Jesus shares 
with God is also shared by the Holy Spirit. 
 As for (10), it could merely be said to be implicit in all of the biblical text, but there 
seems to be at least a few explicit scriptural passages that add considerably more weight to (10). 
For instance, 1 Samuel 2:2 states, “There is no one holy like the LORD, Indeed, there is no one 
besides You, Nor is there any rock like our God.” Of course, if LORD in this passage was only a 
reference to one of the members of the Trinity, say, the Father, then it would certainly not be true 
that there is no one at least like Him, for there would be at least two beings who are similar in 
divinity and holiness. As it were, there then being one divine being and three divine persons 
seems itself to be a difficult mystery for any Trinitarian theory to explain. But scholarship 
reveals that there are at least two primary ways of handling this issue. Most theologians resolve 
this issue by surmounting the inconsistencies, finding various ways to make important 
distinctions to eliminate apparent contradiction. This is no doubt the most popular route. Among 
these are Social Trinitarians and Latin Trinitarians. A rough distinction can be made here, 
wherein Social Trinitarians start with the threeness of God and reason from that stance that God 
is one by something similar or exactly identical to an inexorable and eternal loving relationship. 
Quite oppositely, Latin Trinitarians start with God as one and reason how God can possibly be 
three. These approaches will be discussed here because they share the foundational quality of 
wanting to satisfy human reason while remaining orthodox.  
8 
 
 
 
 There is still another approach known as Mysterianism, which is considered a meta-
theory insofar as it purports to say something about all other theories, but it is also a theory in its 
own right. Mysterianism can be disambiguated into two forms, negative and positive. Negative 
forms of Mysterianism maintain that we simply do not have enough intelligible content to 
determine whether Trinitarian belief is either consistent or inconsistent. That is to say, the 
information provided is either too scarce or itself too unfathomable to form a theory that can be 
toiled and tried by human reason. Conversely, positive Mysterianism asserts that mystery is not 
the result of too little content, but rather an abundance of it. That is, the human mind can 
entertain and even understand many divine truths but sometimes the conjunction of those truths 
dissolves and is seemingly rationally inconsistent. These truths coalesce in paradox inasmuch as 
they are “a set of claims which taken in conjunction appear to be logically inconsistent.” 10 So, 
unlike the negative Mysterianism, positive Mysterianism believes a wide range of content is 
available to make independently truthful claims about God and God’s triunity, though the claims 
themselves are rationally abrasive or seemingly entirely contradictory when conjoined. Therefore 
positive Mysterianism will maintain that the claims themselves are not mysterious, but rather the 
issue of how such claims can remain true when conjoined is what is mysterious. Thus, while 
negative Mysterianism will maintain that it is the content itself that is mysterious, positive 
Mysterianism will profess that it is actually the combination of perfectly epistemically accessible 
claims that becomes increasingly unfathomable. 
 This chapter briefly discussed the Trinitarian problem as it exists in scholarship today. 
Problems arise over issues of logical consistency, intelligibility and/or biblical soundness. The 
premises of the Trinity articulated in Scripture (and compiled by Anderson and Tuggy) make the 
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 J. Anderson, Paradox in Christian Theology: An Analysis of Its Presence, Character, 
and Epistemic Status (Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2007), 4-6. 
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task of any theologian whose goal is a rationally accessible, formulaic expression of the Trinity a 
particularly arduous one. The popular routes used in attempting to traverse this difficult journey 
and surmount the looming problems are expressed in three distinct frameworks: Latin 
Trinitarianism, Social Trinitarianism, and Mysterianism. The following chapters will be devoted 
to explaining these frameworks and discussing how and why the two former are inadequate and 
why the latter may be the only viable alternative.
 10 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LATIN TRINITARIANISM AS THE POSITION OF OUR CHRISTIAN FOREBEARS  
 Chapter one laid the groundwork with regard to what the Trinity positively asserts and 
how this has come to be a problem. This chapter will briefly explain the historical development 
and underpinnings of the Latin Trinitarian (LT) model and how the problems of the previous 
chapter interact with this model. This chapter will also explore the LT attempt to resolve the 
problems specified in the previous chapter. This exploration involves examining issues of 
identity and will look specifically at how modern thinkers have attempted to either stay within 
modern laws of thought or find rational ways to fudge the rules. 
 The LT model is perhaps best described as the traditional view of the Trinity, wherein an 
emphasis is placed more on the belief of independently true propositions without considering 
how these propositions may conflict when conjoined. Associate professor of philosophy at 
Purdue University, Jeffrey Brower, and professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, 
Michael Rea, in their co-authored article, “Understanding the Trinity,” suggest the following 
quote from the Athanasian Creed as a paradigmatic example of this historic understanding of the 
Trinity: 
We Worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in unity, neither confusing the 
Persons, nor dividing the substance. For there is one person for the Father, another 
for the Son, and yet another for the Holy Spirit. But the divinity of the Father, 
11 
 
 
 
Son, and Holy Spirit is one… Thus, the Father is God, the Son is God, and the 
Holy Spirit is God; and yet there are not three Gods, but there is one God.
11
 
 
The claims evident in the aforementioned quote are virtually identical to some of those 
expounded by Tuggy. Brower and Rea narrow it down to these three claims: 
(11) There is exactly one god. 
(12) The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. 
(13) The Father is not the Son, and the Holy Spirit is not the Father or the Son. 
The tension evident in the joint assertion of these premises needs little explanation. How could 
God possibly be numerically equal to one if in fact, three independent divine beings exist who 
are numerically distinct yet precisely identical to God? Thus, the assertion that Latin Trinitarians 
are more concerned with true premises than with how these premises interact with each other 
seems accurate. But as Brower and Rea maintain, no Christian is at liberty to reject any of the 
three latter claims unless he is willing to reject historical orthodoxy and its firm biblical 
foundation.
12
 
 Moreover, the LT tradition seems itself to have been sharpened against the iron of the 
early Church’s most notorious heresies: Polytheism, Subordinationism and Sabellianism. After 
the Constantinian shift in 313 AD, ushered in by the Edict of Milan, whereby Christians were to 
be treated benevolently and given right to worship, there was a great need for the scattered and 
divided Churches to be brought into unity.
13
 Since the dawn of the Church it had known nothing 
besides persecution. From Nero to Diocletian, Domitian to Galerius, the Church had not had 
enough time to campaign against the serious doctrinal issues that began to undo any amount of 
                                                          
 
11
E. Brower Jeffrey and C. Rea Michael, "Understanding the Trinity," Logos: A Journal 
of Catholic Thought and Culture 8, no. 1 (2005): 145. 
 
12
 Ibid, 147. 
 
13
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unity that persecution had afforded.
14
 The pastor of the influential Baucalis church, Arius, fought 
with the then Bishop of Alexanderia, Alexander, over the deity of Jesus and Jesus’ relationship 
to the Father. This conflict and many like it led to the now famous council of Nicaea in 325 AD. 
Thus began Christianity’s creedal journey to define with rigorous accuracy precisely what the 
Bible did and did not say about God.
15
 
 Out of this milieu of biblical precision was born a strict Trinitarianism, and although the 
propositions of this creedal era left our forebears content to commend mystery, contemporary 
theologians and philosophers now take pains to square them with human reason (reason that 
seems increasingly opposed to the actual existence of the mysterious). The pressing question 
now is how well these theologians and philosophers have faired. For instance, the Shield of the 
Trinity or Scutum Fidei, an early symbol of the Trinity with roots in the 12
th
 century (though 
popularized in the 15
th
 and 16
th
 century), gives strong indication as to where the fundamental 
difficulty lies in the LT thesis.
16
 According to the Scutum Fidei, the Father is God, the Son is 
God and the Holy Spirit is God yet none of these numerically distinct persons is identical to the 
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other.
17
 So God is one being wherein three divine persons subsist in completely perfect and 
seemingly incomprehensible coalescence. 
18
 
This leads to what is considered at base the most difficult hurdle for the LT thesis to surpass. 
 
Logical absurdity, the puzzles of identity 
 We are asked in orthodox renderings of the Trinity to affirm a set of supposedly definite 
propositions that, taken together, create a philosophically messy situation. Aristotle famously 
stated, “It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the 
same thing and in the same respect.”19 This has been simplified to what we currently hold to be 
the law of non-contradiction, which is that X cannot be both X and non-X in the same way at the 
same time. For instance, John Lennon cannot be both a man and a non-man in the same way and 
at the same time. Aquinas, following in stride with Aristotle, stated that the necessary action to 
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be taken when faced with a contradiction is to render a distinction. Thinkers bygone and current 
have sought to bring to light these distinctions, and though some of these distinctions include 
temporal modifiers (e.g. Modalism), most are of a semantic quality.
20
 Leaving aside the more 
discernible heterodoxy of temporal distinctions (God is sometimes Father and sometimes Son
21
), 
there are still enormous problems with most semantic distinctions, inasmuch as they run afoul 
with either reason or orthodoxy. The Trinity has never been easy. For how could it be, as an 
instance of the difficulty spoken of here, that the Son, the Father and the Holy Spirit are separate, 
non-identical totals of the same being? How can the Son know all yet be ignorant of some?
22
 
What does it mean to say that separate beings can be identical to God but not one another? Our 
intuition begs us to reconsider the propositions that we are inclined to join inharmoniously 
together–seeds of inconsistency sown by our forebears–wherein we now only reap contradiction. 
The problem is that it frankly makes no sense to say that each person of the Trinity is God but 
that each of these persons is distinctly not the other. The rationale involved in the Scutum Fidei, 
for instance, runs afoul with our most fundamental laws of thought which have long held to be 
undeniably true since the days that Aristotle first articulated them. 
 The most important law of thought for this discussion is the Law of Identity, which states 
that any entity a is exactly equal to itself. Or, in formal logic, a  a (If you have a then you have 
a). Though it is not a tautology in formal logic, it is in ordinary language. This law should also 
be taken in conjunction with Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernibles, which states that it is 
impossible to have an ontological separation among entities that share all the same properties in 
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15 
 
 
 
common.
23
 That is to say, if any entity x shares all of its properties in common with y then it is 
necessary that x and y are the same entity.
24
 Accordingly, in order for an identity relationship to 
exist, like in the Scutum Fidei, three properties of equivalence must obtain symmetry, 
transitivity, and reflexivity. For instance, x is identical to y if and only if it is reflexive, inasmuch 
as it refers to itself (x = x). Similarly, x is identical to y if and only if the relationship could be 
phrased equally as x = y and y = x, making it symmetric. And lastly, x is identical to y if and only 
if it proves to be transitive. In order to be transitive, it would have to be the case that if y = z than 
z = x.  
 This absolute identity seems to be what most early proponents of the Trinity referred to 
when they said that Jesus is God. That is, Jesus is identical to God in the reflexive, symmetric 
and transitive way cited above. Though the Trinity was challenged in various ways from the 
Reformation onward, it was not until the 1960’s, when analytic philosophy took off in the world 
of theology, that the Trinity started becoming more rigorously defined in ways that sought to 
make it defensible by use of reason. As such, many philosophers and theologians who are 
compelled by the propositional claims inherent in the LT thesis (exemplified by the Scutum 
Fidei) have devised creative epicycles in order to avoid the pitfalls created by these rules of 
absolute identity. 
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 In the 20
th
 century, a popular route for those in the LT camp (or who leaned more 
towards the embrace of God’s ultimate oneness) to avoid the abovementioned problems of 
identity was to embrace an essentially modalistic Trinitarian theory. That is precisely what 
influential theologians Karl Barth and Karl Rahner did, endorsing and employing “modes of 
being” or “manners of subsisting” as alternative language for “person.” Accordingly, Jesus was 
not a person, per se, but simply a “manner” or “mode” of God’s subsistence. The majority of 
theologians reject Modalism as heresy, but theologians typically define Modalism as any theory 
that resembles the ancient Sabellianism (of Sabellius) in the 3
rd
 century. This Modalism held 
God’s modes to be a sequential act, wherein His modes came in temporal epochs. First God 
came as transcendent Father to His people, then He came as flesh among them in the form of 
Jesus Christ and now, in this current epoch, God exists as Holy Spirit. Were it not for strong 
biblical evidence to the contrary, this would be a very easy way to solve the ostensibly 
mysterious nature of the Trinity. However, this explanation strongly conflicts with Jesus’ 
baptism in Matthew 3:16, 17, where all three members of the Trinity are present simultaneously. 
It is clear then that theories involving this sort of Modalism should be rejected. Nonetheless, 
some have argued that it is not altogether clear why other forms of Modalism should be rejected 
out of hand.
25
 It could be the case that these modes are non-sequential eternally and maximally 
overlapping modes expressed concurrently. It would be something like a person with a multiple 
personality disorder that could express all separate and distinct personalities simultaneously (the 
psychological impossibility of this scenario notwithstanding).
26
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 The perpetual thorn in the side of even these revised forms of Modalism is the scant 
biblical precedent in its favor. The Bible seems to develop individuated persons who correspond 
with one another in a mutual, personal and loving relationship. Even the biblical accounts 
referenced by Modalists defending their theory must be interpreted in a specific manner. For 
instance, the Father being well pleased with his Son as expressed at Jesus’ baptism would seem 
full of hubris rather than genuine paternal love. For all the Father would be expressing in that 
moment is his pleasure with another mode of himself. Furthermore, such modal language 
becomes increasingly more difficult to maintain when one considers the mediation language of 
the New Testament, where Jesus is said to be the mediator between God and humans. If we 
cannot satisfactorily determine the personhood of Jesus from the New Testament, then we must 
also not be able to determine that Simon really was Peter, despite clear evidence to the contrary.  
 More recently, Brain Leftow, professor of philosophy at Oxford University, introduced a 
Latin theory that supposedly avoids both the problems presented by rules of identity (maybe) and 
the temptations of Modalism.
27
 Leftow summarizes his position: 
On LT, there is just one divine being (or substance), God. God constitutes three 
Persons, but all three are at bottom just God. Thus, the Creed of the Council of 
Toledo has it that ‘although we profess three persons, we do not profess three 
substances, but one substance and three persons…they are not three gods, he is 
one God….Each single person is wholly God in Himself and…all three persons 
together are one God.  
 Again, Aquinas writes that ‘among creatures, the nature the one generated 
receives is not numerically identical with the nature the one generating has….But 
God begotten receives numerically the same nature God betting has.’ Begotten 
receives numerically the same nature God begetting has.’ To make Aquinas’ 
claim perfectly plain, I introduce a technical term, ‘trope’. Abel and Cain were 
both human. So they had the same nature, humanity. Yet each also had his own 
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nature, and Cain’s humanity was not identical with Abel’s… A trope is an 
individualized case of an attribute. Their bearers individuate tropes: Cain’s 
humanity is distinct from Abel’s just because it is Cain’s, not Abel’s. With this 
term in hand, I now restate Aquinas’ claim: while Father and Son instance the 
divine nature (deity), they have but one trope of deity between them, which is 
God’s… bearers individuate tropes. If the Father’s deity is God’s, this is because 
the Father just is God….28 
 
The claims being made here are not entirely clear; perhaps due to the fact that the term “trope” is 
seeking to define something very abstract. In the Cain and Abel example, for instance, we know 
what it means to say that Cain and Abel share the nature of humanity, so far as they both were 
human. Additionally, we also know what it means for Cain and Abel to be uniquely human in a 
way not shared by the other (though it is not entirely clear how this is to be dissected more 
narrowly). Now “trope” seems not to be an attribute itself but instead describes any attribute that 
is entirely unique to one individual.  This must be what Leftow means when he says, “A trope is 
an individualized case of an attribute.” For instance, if Cain weighed 155 pounds, it could not be 
said that the sum of Cain’s bodily parts is equal to Abel’s bodily parts even if their individual 
weights equaled the same. Tuggy actually criticizes Leftow’s proposal as incoherent along these 
lines, inasmuch as it is not entirely clear what it means to say that Cain and Abel are two distinct 
individuals who share the same height trope.
29
 This criticism may be a bit premature, however, 
as is evident in the case of conjoined twins (and though much rarer, there are cases of conjoined 
triplets
30
), wherein two numerically distinct individuals do share the same height trope. Or 
perhaps not, since according to Leftow, the Father has the same trope of divinity with God 
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precisely because the Father just is God. But that is certainly not the case with conjoined twins 
who only share what is normally an individuated attribute. Of course, being non-spaciotemporal 
and immaterial, it is not clear how this could helpfully apply to the Trinity in the Latin sense, 
even if it did work.  
 There are other problems with Leftow’s trope theory too. It seems that Leftow is 
committed to affirming that if any entity x shares the same trope as y, then x = y. But that would 
put us right back at square one, struggling all over again to avoid being committed to the idea 
that the Father and Son are numerically equal. Leftow senses, perhaps, the sort of modalism that 
could be drawn out of this trope theory and clarifies his position: 
In LT, then, the numerical identity of God is secure, but one wonders just how the 
Persons manage to be three. For in LT, the Persons are distinct but not discrete. 
Instead, LT’s Persons have God in common, though not exactly as a common 
part. In [Social Trinitarianism], the Persons are distinct and discrete. There is 
nothing one would be tempted to call a part they have in common. What they 
share is the generic divine nature, an attribute.
31
 
 
It is hard to see what exactly this solves since Leftow seemingly clarifies the obscure with the 
obscure. Perhaps he means to say that the Father and the Son are modes (Tuggy’s term) of the 
same God. The modes are numerically distinct from the other though not exactly equal to that of 
which they are a mode. Leftow further clarifies this with an analogy to a time traveling dance 
member, Jane. Jane’s two other fellow Rockette members called in sick before a performance. 
But lucky for Jane, her nephew just happened to have completed a fully functional time-machine 
wherein she was able to complete the dance routine as all three members. The Trinity analog 
here is evident. God can be three different modes of himself, so to speak, contemporaneously 
with the other modes, all whilst remaining, ostensibly, substantially undivided.  
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 The most important question here is whether or not time travel is even logically possible. 
If it is not, then the analogy is not helpful as a way of making the LT model coherent. To do this, 
Leftow did not attempt to show that time travel is physically possible given our current real-
world physics, but rather that there is some metaphysically possible world where time travel 
could exist. If there is, indeed, some metaphysically possible world where time travel can obtain, 
then the analogy is helpful inasmuch as God could conceivably exist in an analogously similar 
way.  
 Leftow’s analogy may not be as helpful as it appears, however. It is hard to imagine how 
the metaphysically possible existence of time travel illuminates the fundamental problem. In fact, 
it seems like Leftow is seeking to explain mystery by appealing to mystery. If time travel is 
metaphysically possible, it is a mysterious feat, overcoming significant coherency issues. For 
instance, there are issues of continuity that involve the possibility of a future-self traveling 
backwards in time and murdering the past-self. Or a future-self informing the past-self about 
how to build the time machine that allowed future-self to travel backwards to begin with. These 
as well as many more examples constitute significant intuitive problems that are not contingent 
upon physics,
32
 but rather upon the logical laws of thought that seemingly govern all logically 
possible worlds.
33
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 But even if we assume that Leftow’s analogy goes through as planned because it is 
broadly conceivable (which Leftow argues
34
), there may be a more pernicious problem at work. 
If it is true that the ontology of God is comprised of something similar to the instantiation of a 
person who has time-traveled backwards twice to the same moment, then we have three 
instantiations of the same person. What would subsequently delineate these three instantiations 
would be the way they lived their lives. As applied to the Trinity, God would in one strand of his 
life live in a fatherly way, in still another he would live in a sonly way, and lastly, presumably, 
he would live in a pneumatic way. Thus, what ultimately delineates the persons of God is simply 
the way they live their life. This is not a substantive delineation, but an adjectival one. 
Furthermore, it is hard to see how these manifestations could be present prior to the creation of 
the universe and time. God not being temporally bound yet also being comprised of persons that 
are only distinguishable by the way they live is a mysterious conundrum. 
Latin Trinitarianism and Relative Identity Theory 
 Because of the problems of absolute identity, some thinkers sought to instead redefine 
identity. It may not be entirely accurate to call this approach an LT theory, because in many 
respects it transcends what is commonly seen as the divide between LT and ST theories. 
However, the theory itself is intended to validate the words of our forebears who defined God as 
simultaneously one and three. In this respect, the theory is Latin. The primary issue for LT 
theories centers on identity. But what if we could fudge the rule a bit? What if these so-called 
laws of identity are not as absolute as they intuitively seem? It is this question that many current 
theologians and philosophers are now asking in hopes of erecting a theory powerful enough to 
sustain the LT frame. Nothing is more powerful in this respect than simply denying that there is 
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such a relation as identity, commonly denoted by the mathematical symbol “=”.  Numerical 
identity, however, is specifically meaningless in this case and the only kind of identity that 
matters is the sort of identity relative to some other thing. In relationship to the Trinity, Tuggy 
defines the relative-identity thesis as follows: 
 (5
II
) Each divine person (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) is the same god as the others,  
  but is not the same person as the others.
35
 
 
It is very hard to interpret the meaning of this statement. Tuggy suggests that “at best, this sort of 
refined LT can give us a version of internally consistent Trinitarian claims, but it does so at the 
price of intelligibility.”36 It seems rather prima facie true that there is such a relationship as non-
relative identity. The intelligibility of everyday speech and understanding unilaterally hinges 
upon the single notion of universal identity. Identity is described as “the only relation that 
everything has to itself and nothing has to anything else.”37 Nonetheless, many philosophers 
have attempted to redefine identity in a way that allows something like (5
II
).
38
 Thus relative 
identity solutions are mostly occupied with determining the precise logic that would make this 
identity possible and little effort towards how this would then be applied to God.  Rea observes 
two different versions of the doctrine being tried and tested among philosophers. The weak 
version he lists as: 
 (RI1) States of affairs of the following sort are possible: x is an F, y is an F, x is a G, y  
  is a G, x is the same F as y, but x is not the same G as y. 
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Rea also lists the strong version: 
  
 (RI2)  Either absolute (classical) identity does not exist, or statements of the form ‘x = y’ 
  are to be analyzed in terms of statements of the form ‘x is the same F as y’ rather  
  than the other way around. 
 
Rea admits that (RI2) is not necessary for alleviating problems associated with the Trinity but 
notes that some popular philosophers, namely Peter Geach, endorse it nonetheless. Rea goes on 
to describe how invoking relative identity schemas to solve problems of the Trinity is not helpful 
unless some sort of “supplemental story” exists to clarify the situation. For instance, appealing to 
(RI1) without this additional information only suffices in replacing “one mystery with another.” 
The problem is that (RI1) really does not say anything about God, it only defines our conceptual 
analysis of God. Thus, we could say that Jesus and the Father are the same God, but we really 
have no idea what that actually means. 
 Rea and Bower, however, suggest a constitutional view that supplies the right “story,” so 
to speak, to allow us to make sense of the (RI1) theory with respect to the Trinity. Rea presents 
the example of an artistic building contractor who fashions a statue that is also to be used as a 
pillar. Of course, we would not say that these two distinct descriptions are also two material 
objects, as if fused. Instead, we are perfectly content in distinguishing the pillar and statue, even 
though they comprise a single material object. While surface erosion in time will destroy the 
details that make it a statue, it will not destroy the pillar in like manner. Contradistinctively, if 
some internal damage to the pillar material that corrupts its load-bearing capabilities and requires 
removal of the material structure in order to preserve to the statue, we could say that the pillar 
has been destroyed though the statue remains. Rea insists that though the pillar and statue 
comprise one material object, they are not identical. If this is, indeed, true, then it only makes 
sense under (RI1).  
24 
 
 
 
 Does this explanation really work? For instance, we can imagine Michelangelo’s “David” 
sculpture (fig. 1), which is made of solid marble. The marble that constitutes “David” is 
numerically equal to the statue “David” itself. But the statue and the marble are not identical, 
inasmuch as the marble could be used to form another, different statue. This interpretation seems 
to be precisely what the LT theory needs to make a cogent case, a way to say that the Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit are numerically equal to God yet non-identical persons. This all seems to be in 
order, but William Lane Craig, an analytic philosopher and research professor at the Talbot 
School of Theology at Biola University, criticizes this composition theory, suggesting that it 
makes very little sense to say that one portion of matter can simultaneously have incompatible 
properties. For instance, “David” has no incompatible properties with the marble and the marble 
none with “David.” The entire portion of marble that forms “David” cannot simultaneously be 
both “David” and “The Reclining Hermaphrodite,” as “David” and “The Reclining 
Hermaphrodite” do not have compatible properties (say, the fact that David stands and 
Hermaphrodite lays as example of the many differences). So it would have to be true that the 
persons of the Trinity do not manifest incompatible properties. But this simply cannot be said. 
Craig suggests that it is true for Jesus to think “I died on a cross,” but that it would not make 
sense for the Father or Spirit to think the same thing. Jesus has the property of begettedness, 
while the Father does not. The Holy Spirit has the property of procession and the Father does 
not. The Son can truly say He lived and died in a remote part of Palestine a finite time ago, while 
the others cannot. This existence of incompatible properties not accounted for in Rea and 
Bower’s analogy make it of no use to the subject it most dearly wishes to resolve.  
25 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Michelangelo’s David Sculpture.39 
  
 Other problems have to do with the idea of taking Aristotle’s hylomorphic compound 
ideas too seriously. It is also not clear whether there is a meaningful ontological difference 
between marble and the statue it comprises. There are certainly conceptual differences and, in the 
case of the pillar and statue example, functional ones, but any real differences beyond subject-
bound perceptions of the material remain hazy. For instance, a farmer may view a pitch fork as a 
reliable instrument for pitching hay or other loose materials. A warrior may find the same 
instrument to be better suited as a weapon, valuable for thrusting into the fray. These conceptual 
perceptions with regard to the functional utility of the same instrument are not identical, nor 
would any thinking person believe so, but the instrument from which these conceptions were 
derived remains wholly identical to itself. But surely the theory intends to extend farther than the 
mere perceptual, though it still remains to be seen how such a task is possible, as even the 
examples portray human perception regarding a single unified molecular mass. 
 Therefore, while Bower and Rea do scale back and affirm a weaker form of relative 
identity, granting that non-relative identity exists parallel to instances of irreducible relational 
identity, they fail to provide an intelligible “supplemental story.” Thus, Tuggy’s criticism rings 
true: 
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No Philosopher has given a convincing example of two things which are the same 
(some kind of thing) but not the same (some other kind of thing). One would be 
incredulous if told, for example, that John and Peter were the same apostle but 
different men, or that  Rover and Spot were the same mammal but different dogs. 
Why should one be less incredulous at claims like (5
II
), or the claim that the Son 
is the same being as, but a different person than the Father? It seems that this sort 
of refined LT is to attempt to illuminate the obscure by the obscure.
40
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter briefly discussed the history and development of the LT theory and the 
premises that it is committed to defending. Out of a milieu of persistent challenges to the 
unrefined doctrines of Christianity, the LT theory emerged as a clear biblical guide against the 
heresies of Arius, Sabellius, and the manifestations of Subordinationism and polytheism 
respectively. The problem is that once this guide became the subject of the refined logical lens of 
western pedantry, it became clear that the premises it contained could not be jointly asserted 
without contradiction. Most specifically, as was discussed in this chapter, there were clear 
problems of identity. For how could two separate non-identical things both respectively be 
identical to some other thing? In attempting to resolve these issues of identity, Leftow appealed 
to the metaphysical possibilities afforded by a time-traveling analogy. Rea and Bower used the 
uncertain reality of relative identity, where entities can be the same x but not the same y–or more 
clearly, where individuals can be the same God but not the same person. While Leftow struggled 
with a new type of modalism and tried to clarify the uncertain with the logically nebulous, Rea 
and Bower did not construct the supplemental story necessary for making their theory 
intelligible. Subsequently, the LT theory is not in a prized position insofar as it has attempted to 
use reason to defend its position, whereas reason seems increasingly disinclined to validate it. 
Chapter 1 discussed that if the goal is a rationally accessible, formulaic expression of the Trinity, 
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the task would be difficult. Indeed, while the LT theory cannot be faulted for any shortcomings 
with regard to biblical soundness, it can certainly be said to significantly falter with respect to 
logical consistency and intelligibility. In response to these problems, some theologians and 
philosophers have attempted to trek forward in a new way. This novel path, Social 
Trinitarianism, will be the specific focus of the following chapter, where the theory will be 
examined in order to ascertain whether it can survive similar criticism.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
SOCIAL TRINITARIANISM AND A FAMILY OF DIVINITIES 
In chapter 1 the problem was stated: formulaic expressions of the Trinity that are 
rationally accessible must surmount problems of logical consistency and intelligibility while also 
remaining distinctly biblical in nature. Chapter 2 surveyed the LT theory and its attempt to meet 
this burden. There we saw that while the LT theory can boast of its fidelity to the Bible and our 
early church forebears, it cannot without some significant strain to credulity, boast that it has 
surmounted issues of logical consistency. Indeed, the LT theory has a problem with the transitive 
nature of identity, where if Jesus is God and the Father is God, then Jesus and the Father must be 
the same. But clearly they are not.  
Therefore, in order to avoid the necessities demanded by identity relationships, some 
philosophers have opted to deny that the Father, Jesus or the Holy Spirit are individually exactly 
equivalent to God. This chapter then will briefly explore the development of the Social Trintiy 
and discuss the theories of those who most prominently defend it. This will include a focus on 
what it means for God to be three and how a proponent of the ST theory can reliably say that 
God is also one. 
After surviving the toils of the early first centuries, Tritheism attracted a renaissance of 
sophistication through the rigor of scholastic attention in the early 20
th
 century. Though 
29 
 
 
 
Cornelius Plantinga is largely accepted to have developed Social Trinitiarinism first (certainly its 
name) in his now famous article “The Threeness/Oneness Problem of the Trinity,” his central 
thesis regarding the Trinity is not unlike Moltmann’s and Boff’s before him, namely that God is 
primarily three before he is one.
41
 
 The analytical philosophy that the second half of the 20
th
 century provided, a largely 
Anglophone practice of reducing ideas into atomic sentences that can be weighed through 
rigorous logical laws and philosophical principles of reason, allowed for the Trinity to be studied 
in a way unlike ever before. In logical terms, the ancient creeds of our forebears seemed 
incoherent. Thus, unlike Moltmann and Boff, who rejected the LT versions of the trinity due to 
its reliance on monarchial models, Plantinga deduced a social model based on his experience 
with analytical philosophy. Plantinga saw the threeness/oneness controversy as the “central 
conceptual problem” in the doctrine of the Trinity.42 The primary reason for his conclusion stems 
from the notion that all Christian doctrines come in “conceptual clusters,” inasmuch as a certain 
view of, say, sin, will have drastic implications for the manner in which one considers the 
doctrine of election. In no other area of doctrinal theology is this idea more profoundly 
articulated than in the longstanding debate between Calvinistic and Wesleyan-Arminian 
theology. The idea of Total Depravity with the conspicuous absence of any kind of prevenient 
grace necessitates a kind of election wherein only God participates. Human participation in the 
work of salvation is absolutely illusory.  
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 With this understanding of theology as coming in “conceptual clusters,” Plantinga argues 
that there is no doctrine more supremely important than the central doctrine of Christianity–the 
Trinity. How we conceive of the Trinity affects our entire theological enterprise. Plantinga states, 
“A particular or peculiar statement of the doctrine of the Trinity will, for the sake of coherence, 
compel adjustments in nearly all other doctrinal areas.”43 
 Plantinga understands the argument to be expressed most fully in the “debate between 
Karl Barth and his followers on the one side and social Trinitarians on the other.” Plantinga 
muses that the divine life exists in some essential way as both three and one. It is the task of the 
theologian to determine the referents of these numbers. God must be three in some way and one 
in another.
44
 Karl Barth’s answer to this dilemma is controversial, to put it lightly, in that he bit 
the modalistic bullet, so to speak, in defending the position that God consisted of “modes of 
being.” Barth saw the work of the Trinity as so dogmatically important (contra Friedrich 
Schleirmacher, who saw the systematic work of the Trinity as peripheral
45
) that he placed it at 
the beginning of his Church Dogmatics.
46
  
 Barth asserts that God is not the object of human scrutiny that can come to be known on 
the basis of intuition. Instead, God is the object of God’s own self-knowledge and consequently 
can only be known via revelation. Thus, in the Bible, we are presented with a unique self-
unveiling of God to humanity, wherein we partake of the mystery of God’s triunity. In fact, 
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Barth exemplified Plantinga’s “conceptual clusters” with respect to Christian theology, in that he 
sought to take on “all aspects of Christian doctrine with Trinitarian teaching in mind.”47 Barth 
objected to a threeness in personhood, thus, whilst many theologians describe entities within the 
Trinity as separate persons, Barth’s polemic against individuated personhood consisted of his use 
of an alternative word, Seinsweise, commonly translated as “mode of being.” 48 Robert Letham, 
in his, The Holy Trinity, states that, “For casual readers, this at once conjures up the specter of 
modalism.”49 While Letham suggests that Barth was modalistic in his formulation of the Trinity, 
he at the end seems to somewhat pull his punches saying: 
There is this persistent ambiguity at the heart of Barth’s Trinitarianism that does 
not change. If he is not modalistic, he will escape from the charge of  
unipersonality only with the greatest difficulty.
50
 
 
For Barth, God’s unity was unilaterally tied to his personhood, thus, it could not be said that the 
Son and the Holy Spirit are separate, individuated persons, inasmuch as, for Barth, the oneness 
of God was his personhood. Thus, the figures that comprise the personhood of God are not 
themselves persons but are rather ways or modes of the persons of God. This is troubling for 
more than just the casual reader, as it is not at all clear how a way or a mode of being can exist in 
a loving relationship with another way or mode of being. Consequently, for Barth, God really is 
only one personality speaking through, in psychological terms, a single Ego. Barth fought against 
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individuated personhood for the members of the Trinity since, ostensibly, there would be some 
sort of unmitigated Tritheism.  
 Totally unlike Barth, Leondard Hodgson, an Anglican Priest and philosopher of the early 
to mid-20
th
 century, argued that ascribing modes to God was an unsatisfactory way to describe 
the ultimate threeness of God. Instead, according to Hodgson, not only are the members of the 
Trinity persons in the fullest sense of the word, but they are also, “intelligent, purposive centres 
of consciousness.”51 The sort of Trinitarian theorizing that Hodgson embodies has come to be 
considered the social Trinitarian model, wherein the Trinity, or simply God, consists of three 
truly individuated persons. In contradistinction to what can be described as the Barthian view 
and the social Trinitarian view, Plantinga engages another view, which he refers to as the 
traditional Catholic view but what this Thesis has called the Latin Trinitarian model. The central 
question that Plantinga began with, namely, “How is God one and how is God three?” is 
answered in diametrically different ways by all parties. Asked another way, Plantinga inquires, 
“how many persons does God comprise?” Those in the Barthian camp unequivocally state that 
God is one person. A social Trinitarian will answer that God is comprised of three distinct 
persons. Those in the Latin Trinitarian camp will state that God is both one and three. Plantinga 
summarizes the position of the Latin Trinitarian thusly: 
These Trinitarians seem to want to answer the central question both ways. God 
comprises three persons in some full sense of ‘person.’ But since each of these is 
in fact identical with the one divine essence, or each is in fact a center of exactly 
the same divine consciousness, the de facto number of persons in God is finally 
hard to estimate.”52 
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Plantinga uses the following summary passages of the Athanasian Creed as a reference point for 
discussing the three aforesaid Trinitarian views: 
(14) So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. 
(15) And yet they are not three Gods, but one God. 
The nagging question then, is what do we really mean when we confess that the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit are each uniquely God but that there are, in fact, not three Gods, but one? This is 
summarily asked when Plantinga poses three contrasting analogies, the first of which is as 
follows:  
Is it like saying John Cooper is professor of theology at Calvin Seminary, Henry 
Zwaanstra is professor of theology at Calvin Seminary, and Ted Minnema is 
professor of theology at Calvin Seminary, and yet they are not three Calvin 
professors, but only one?”53 
 
Plantinga suggests that such a reading is highly inappropriate, inasmuch as it renders (14) 
directly contradictory of (15). He further prods that, “Here one instinctively feels the point of the 
seventeenth-century anitrintiarian complain that Trinitarians simply do not know how to 
count.”54 Thus, Plantinga believes that the Trinity must be intelligible to the human brain in 
order to exist. One may rightly wonder how plausible it is to believe that the existence of an 
ostensible creator of all things spaciotemporal and heavenly would be contingently bound to the 
limits of human conceivability.  
 The second analogy that Plantinga employs avoids this problem of seeming incoherency 
but presents us with other difficulties: 
The oldest native Minnesotan teaching philosophy at Calvin College is Nick 
Wolterstorff; the author of Until Justice and Peace embrace is Nick Wolterstorff; 
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and the only Michigander who loves the music of a Messiaen is Nick 
Wolterstorff, yet, there are not three Nick Wolterstorffs but only one.
55
 
 
We may say without much explanation that this calls to mind the infamous heresy of modalism, 
where God simply functionally distinguishes Himself through the manifestation of different 
roles. This analogy seems most congenial with Barth’s Seinsweise theory of God’s composition. 
 The third analogy that ostensibly comports with the social Trinitarian thesis is stated 
thusly:  
The Cartwright family includes a son Adam, who is tall, silent serious; a son Hoss 
who is massive, gap-toothed, indelicate; and a son Little Joe, who is a roguish and 
charming ladies’ man.56 
 
While the sons are quite observably different, inasmuch as they are possessed of their own 
unique personal identities, they are held in union through family. That is to say, Adam, Hossm 
and Little Joe are three persons but one family. The difficulty on this front is that it seems 
nothing short of Tritheism, inasmuch as it seems that there really are just three gods whose only 
definite similarity happens to be their affinity to the same noun. 
 Plantinga does not spar lightly (especially with regard to the LT view) when he 
summarizes our options with the following words: 
The situation looks doctrinally familiar: coherent views on either end of a 
spectrum are called heretical, while the middle view, trying to have it both ways, 
seems utterly paradoxical and literally unbelievable. People who take this middle 
position often construe the orthodox claim as holding that in God each of Father, 
Son, and Spirit is a distinct person; yet they aren’t three persons but one. And in 
some quarters this view is dignified with the term “mystery.” But, of course, 
without equivocation there’s nothing really mysterious about the claim that in 
God there both are and aren’t three persons. In fact it’s not really a claim at all, 
for what it affirms it also denies. The middle way isn’t a mystery but a mess, and 
it ought to be rejected.
57
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In pursuit of the erstwhile progenitors of the LT view that Plantinga finds intellectually unstable, 
he ultimately locates Augustine as the most significant early supporter. From Augustine onward 
we find “classically paradoxical statements of Trinitarian doctrine.”58 The theory that Plantinga 
puts forward is that Augustine essentially borrowed from two disparate sources, the Bible 
(specifically Johannine theology) and neo-platonic thought. Plantinga describes the Gospel of 
John (and Augustine’s use of it) as presenting an essentially pluralistic understanding of God, 
wherein we see three subjects who possess individuated attributes and their own personhood, 
identifying Augustine “as much like a Johannine pluralist as his Greek contemporaries, the 
Cappadocians, and as Hilary did a generation earlier.”59 However, according to the Neo-Platonic 
doctrine of simplicity, Augustine also holds to an incredibly monistic conception of God, 
inasmuch as all of who God is collapses into a divine essence that itself is comprised of no 
individuated by parts or parcels—the Trinity just is this essence. In fact, Augustine’s heavy 
oscillating emphasis between a sort of Trithiesm and modalistic Monarchianism was so strong 
that Nineteenth-century British church historian Levi Paine asked of Augustine, “Was he a 
Sabellian without knowing it, and even while striving to distinguish his doctrine from that of 
Sabellius?”60 Paine further noted that,  
The critical test of Sabellianism versus the Nicene doctrine is whether the Trinity 
is essentially one Being or three Beings. Sabellianism says one Being; 
Athanasianism says three Beings. Hence Saballianism is monistic, while 
Athanasianism is trinitarian. Here Augustine plainly sides with Sabellius?
61
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Theologian Gerald Bray considers Augustine to be contradictory, though Augustine may have 
been more concerned with true statements rather than the coherency of the joint assertion of 
those same statements.
62
 Though, somewhat ironically, author Millard Erickson, in his book God 
in Three Persons, surmises that an analysis of De Trinitate, Augustine’s major work on the 
Trinity,
63
 reveals that trinitarianism is a circuitous oscillation between Tritheism and Modalism. 
Erickson comments that,  
There is a fundamental difficulty that lies at the heart of discussion of the doctrine 
of the Trinity: The doctrine seems impossible to believe, because at its very core 
it is contradictory.
64
 
 
This fight to balance the Neo-platonic view of simplicity with tritheistic notions of God is how 
Plantinga ultimately summarizes Augustine’s view of the Trinity specifically and the LT view 
generally. In Plantinga’s judgment, Thomas Aquinas followed suit, presenting the Trinity as a 
unity comprised of three real persons. However, these three persons are regarded individually as 
whole and full manifestations of the divine essence. The only real difference between the 
members of the Trinity, according to Aquinas, is in the nature of their relationship, or simply 
how they relate to one another. The Father is seen just as paternity, the son just as filiation, and 
the Spirit just as procession and spiration. But, according to Plantinga, 
Thomas simplifies things so aggressively that even that difference is eventually 
washed out…these relations themselves…are really the same thing as the divine 
essence. They  differ from it only in intelligibility, only in perception, only 
notionally, not ontologically.  For everything in the universe that is not the divine 
essence is a creature.
65
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While Plantinga describes the “threeness part” as “biblical and plausible” he insists that the 
oneness part is “both implausible and unbiblical.” The final reduction of the members of the 
Trinity to abstract divine essences that have identical sets of properties renders talk of persons 
ultimately meaningless, inasmuch as it fails to make an actual distinction. If we take the LT view 
as saying that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are really just names for the same divine essence, 
then we have not elevated beyond modalism. If we, on the other hand, say that the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit are real persons who finally reduce to divine essences that have identical 
properties, then we have simply taken more steps to arrive at the same conclusion. 
 Turning briefly to the Barthian Trinitarian model, which Plantinga describes as inherently 
modalistic, Plantinga suggests that while the Barthian model can boast coherence, it fails to 
present a cogent and compelling biblical account. Plantinga admits that “mode” can be used 
appropriately, but the meaning employed by modern modalists like Eberhard Jüngel, Robert 
Jenson, Karl Rahner, Hendrikus Berkhof and Dorothy Sayers is too reductionist.
66
 He says, 
They reduce three divine persons to modes or roles of one person, thus robbing 
the doctrine of God of its rich communitarian overtones. They often do this, 
incidentally, while trying simultaneously to harvest from trinity doctrine all the 
best fruits of a more social view, such as intratrinitarian harmony, mutuality, 
fellowship, and intersubjectivity. Nobody is more eloquent on these benefits than 
Karl Barth. Barth wants in heaven a model of covenant fellowship, the archetype 
of mutuality that we image as males and females, and a ground for the ethics of 
agape. But, to tell the truth, his theory cannot consistently yield these fruits. For 
modes do not love at all. Hence, they cannot love each other.
67
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Consequently, modern modalists are stuck to make sense of passages of relational love between 
the members of the Trinity, for example John 14:31, where Jesus says, “…I love the Father.” The 
biblical witness makes this coherent system of the Trinity extremely unsavory. 
 Finally, Plantinga revisits the social Trinitarian analogy, wishing to absolve it of the 
allegations of Tritheism. In this view, we are not dealing with “three miscellaneous divine 
persons each of whom discovers he has the divine essence and all of whom therefore form an 
alliance to get on together and combine their loyalties and work.” Such would be nothing short 
of Tritheism.
68
 Instead, Plantinga suggests that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit share mutually 
and wholly in the divine essence but are also possessed of their own personal divine essences. 
Moreover, Plantinga explains that: 
Both kinds of essence unify. The generic essence assures that each person is fully 
divine. The personal essences relate each to the other in unbroken, unbreakable 
love and loyalty. For the Father has essentially the property of being permanently 
related to the Son in an ineffable closeness akin to a parent/child relation. The Son 
has essentially the property of being permanently related to the Father in an 
ineffable closeness akin to a child/parent relation. Let us say that the Spirit has 
essentially the property of being the Father and Son's loyal agent. They in turn 
have the complement of this property: it is essential to them to have the Spirit as 
their loyal agent.
69
 
 
The hurdle to be jumped is how, precisely, to come to terms with this in regard to the 
aforementioned core premises of the Athanasian Creed. There are different ways of 
understanding what, precisely, the word God means in (14) and (15). We could take the creed to 
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be using God in the same way that the Old and New Testament often employ the word, namely 
as the special name for the Father alone. That is to say, while there are three divine persons, there 
is only one God who is the Father. But then, (14) does not say divine persons, lest we wish to 
fudge in some way, but rather that all three persons are, indeed, God. Thus, the creed would have 
to be using the meaning of “God” in a certain way in (14), only to immediately run with a 
different meaning in (15). We could take God to mean the Trinity entirely, but then we have not 
sailed in any meaningful way from the problem at hand, all we would be saying is that Jesus is 
the Trinity, the Father is the Trinity, and the Spirit is the Trinity, yet there is not three Trinities 
but one. Indeed, this seems even more fantastic in its absurdity than the original (that is if they 
are truly saying anything different). 
 This problem of equivocation ultimately boils down to having to use two different 
meanings of the same word in two corresponding verses of the Athanasian Creed. This would 
seem a problem to most readers, but Plantinga confesses that it is “no particular problem: verses 
[(14)] and [(15)] do not form an argument that would be invalidated by equivocation. They rather 
make a sequence of confessional assertions that, on the reading just offered, need to be 
understood precisely in order that their coherence might be preserved.”70 Plantinga does not 
understand such equivocation as a problem for the reason that it would be, perhaps, a graver 
problem to allow the Athanasian Creed to assert seeming incoherency with regard to God’s 
triune nature. Leftow refers to this social attempt as “Plantingean Arianism,” arguing in his 
paper, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” that social models like the one propagated by Plantinga, 
finally collapse into plain incoherence or polytheism. Leftow argues that social models misread 
the Athanasian Creed and simply cannot be considered monotheistic any more than carnivores 
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can be considered vegetarian.
71
 Plantinga’s logic is not dissimilar from Einar Duenger Bohn, 
who argued that the Trinity is an instance of one-many identity, similar to a pair of shoes. That is 
to say, a pair of shoes, while comprised of two entities, which are not identical to each other, 
coalesces into a single identity known as a pair.
72
 Some metaphysicians claim that the 
composition of any entity is exactly equal to the fusion of its individual parts.
73
 So God is the 
necessary fusion of three divine beings. This seems to grossly misrepresent the Athanasian 
Creed, wherein two separate uses of the word God would have to be used one after the other.
74
 
Similarly, this social model suffers from the criticism of quaternity as discussed earlier, where 
we are left with four ostensibly unique members, the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, and God 
(the Trinity). 
 It would be hard to escape this quaternity criticism for want of orthodox alternatives. For 
instance, to say that three separate and individuated divine persons make yet still another divine 
person brought forth through the conjoining of all three is to make a subsantival claim 
concerning four ontologically distinct entities. For one would have four divine persons. Or, if 
this is truly not the claim, then the alternative is to downgrade the claim to an adjectival one, 
insofar as the claim does not properly concern four nouns but rather concerns three nouns and the 
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fourth merely being an adjectival claim with regard to the other three persons. Thus, God is not a 
person at all, but a description of what three divine persons are when referred to as a whole. But 
saying God is neither a person, place nor thing, but rather a description of some other 
individuated entities, is an affront to biblical orthodoxy, where any reference to God would be 
rendered essentially meaningless because, as an adjective, it would have no referent.
75
Similarly, 
Howard-Snyder suggests that the ST suggestion that “God has three persons as proper parts, but 
God, the Trinity ‘as a whole,’ is not a person,” makes the beginning section of Genesis 
particularly awkward, where the intentional act of creation takes place, and must, by necessity, 
take place by a person.
76
 William Hasker, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Huntington 
University, however, proposes that a composite “can ‘borrow’ properties from its proper parts.”77 
Though it strains credulity to think that a concept is capable of receiving the property of 
intentional creation, to do anything of its undertaking is to “borrow” it in the first place. 
 Plantinga’s contributions to the doctrine of the Trinity are manifold. If it is true that 
Plantinga offers a more biblical presentation of the Trinity, then his ideas are truly invaluable. At 
the very least, however, Plantinga has offered strong reasons for reevaluating old Trinitarian 
models and suggesting helpful ways of reimagining the Trinity.  
Held together by One Substance 
 Other theologians and philosophers have followed suit and have suggested additional 
social analogies for the Trinity. Leftow described essentially three different variations of ST: (1) 
functional monotheism, (2) group-mind monotheism and (3) Trinity monotheism. Swinburne is a 
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prime example of the first, where it is the perfect and harmonious assertion of efforts that render 
the three Gods one—insofar as they are truly one in purpose. Thus, as the category has it, the 
three persons of the Trinity are merely functionally triune.
78
 The latter two categories, however, 
seek to bind the three persons of the Trinity in a more substantial way.   
Those in the group-mind camp have appealed to modern brain science, which has 
established evidence for the existence of a mind with multiple minds. Commissurotomy is an 
operation in neurosurgery performed to treat severe cases of epilepsy. In this procedure, the 
corpus callosum that connects the right and left hemisphere of the brain undergoes bisection. 
Sometimes patients who undergo this treatment subsequently manifest two separate centers of 
consciousness.
79
 Attempts to utilize this phenomenon as a helpful analogy have been few. 
Leftow cites C.J.F Williams as one champion of a theory that utilizes the aforesaid analogy. In 
order to make these three centers of consciousness one, Williams suggests that the wills of the 
Trinity “coincide so completely that there is a single act of willing.”80 While Hasker wonders 
why, if there is literally a single set of mental states, there would even be three persons in the 
first place, Leftow suggests that incoherency arises when you try to ascribe first-person mental 
states to William’s Trinity, saying, “…if the Persons have just one mental state among them it is 
unclear how any one Person could refer just to himself.”81  
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 William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian 
Worldview offer a different analogy in favor of their Trinity monotheism that expresses a 
substantial connection between the persons of the Trinity. Moreland and Craig straightforwardly 
assert that the Trinity alone is God and the persons of the Trinity are merely divine.
82
 They 
consider Cerberus, who, in Greek and Roman mythology, is usually depicted as a three-headed 
dog that guards the gates of the Underworld.
83
 In these depictions, Cerberus is a single substance 
or hellhound, with three unique self-consciousnesses. The application is clear, perhaps God, too, 
“is a single spiritual substance or soul with three self-consciousnesses.”84 Analogies of this sort 
can be taken outside of the mythical, as Craig points out later on his website, 
Reasonablefaith.org. For instance, there are reptiles and mammals that have shared one 
substance, so to speak, and have possessed two separate centers of consciousness (see Fig. 2).  
  
(a) (b) 
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Fig 2: Some two-headed reptiles
85
 
 
Craig uses these as examples in response to Daniel Howard-Snyder’s criticism of Craig and 
Moreland’s Trinity Monotheism in Philosophia Christi.86 Howard-Snyder suggests that the 
mythological hellhound, Cerberus, is actually a poor analogy, inasmuch as the hound is really 
only “three partially overlapping dogs.”87 Craig suggests that this claim is “astonishing” because 
such creatures really do exist in the real world. Craig states that: 
The metaphysician who wants us to believe that what we actually see here is 
something far more bizarre and recherché than a mutant turtle, namely, two turtles 
which overlap except for their protruding heads, had better have some pretty 
compelling arguments for thinking that this is the case. But Howard-Snyder offers 
none. He simply asserts it.
88
 
 
However, it is hard to see how Craig and Moreland’s thesis survives once evidence is brought to 
the forefront. For instance, Polycephaly is a well understood biological condition wherein 
animals are born with more than one head. Bicephalic (two-headed) and tricephalic (three-
headed) animals observed in the real world are the result of a failed separation of twins who 
formed from a single zygote (monozygotic twins). These creatures with multiple heads are really 
just two or more fused persons. Thus, to say that Cerberus is just three overlapping dogs is closer 
to observed reality than Craig’s assertion to the contrary. When this phenemonon is witnessed in 
the human kingdom, in the case of Abigail and Brittany Hensel (dicephalic twins whose 
symmetry gives the appearance of one unified body), for example, no one honestly suggests that 
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this is a single person or human with two heads. Instead, it is considered to be two human 
individuals who are fused together. 
 The problem seems to ultimately boil down to an ontological question of what 
individuates an individual, or in this case, a dog. Howard-Snyder suggests that there cannot exist 
a single dog with three totally separate, distinct and fully functional brains, it simply affronts 
credulity, given that the brain is what ostensibly individuates individuals. For Craig and 
Moreland, it seems that it is the actual wholeness of the substance that individuates individuals. 
Since the turtle and the snake in figure 1 are clearly one substance, we can say that two 
consciousnesses exist in one turtle. Craig and Moreland’s position seems incredibly ontologically 
nebulous, especially when you consider cases of conjoined twins who are later separated by 
operation. In such cases we can say at least two things: (1) either there was one human in one 
body with two centers of consciousness prior to operation and then after the operation there were 
two new humans (the third human that they at once formed together now ceasing?), or (2) there 
were two humans prior to the operation and two humans after. In this case, it seems intuition is 
firmly in the favor of (2). This means that the social Trinitarian analogy has not sufficiently 
supplanted the accusation of Tritheism with a cogent monotheistic explanation. 
 There are other problems with Social Trinitarian positions. One offered by Leftow is that 
of “diminished divinity,” which suggests that if the persons of the Trinity are not whole 
instantiations of the divine nature, then they at best share in some sort of diminished divinity, 
wherein the fullness of divinity is only truly expressed in the collation of all three persons, the 
group known as the Trinity. A similar objection to God as a group of divine persons comes from 
Tuggy. Recalling the previous premises listed in the introduction, we can see how the Social 
Trinitarian thesis infers the rejected premise (5b)—that is, God is numerically distinct from any 
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of these: Father, Son, Holy Spirit. This thesis has rejected (5b) because of its obvious problems 
with the Athanasian Creed. But ST affirms (5b) clearly in its reasoning. Tuggy puts it this way: 
Nothing is identical to one of its proper parts. If any thing X is composed of three 
different proper parts, A, B, and C, then X is not identical to either A, B, or C. 
Therefore, if God is identical to this community, then He can’t also be identical to 
one member of it, for instance the Holy Spirit. In sum, if ST is true, then so is 
[(5b)].
89
 
 
While it remains true that ST variations are not committed to a contradictory set of propositions, 
it does not remain true that they affirm all propositions necessary for maintaining an orthodox 
understanding of the Trinity. The cost of avoiding Tritheism is simply too high, as it only 
succeeds by claiming that the persons of the Trinity are not themselves God at all. According to 
Tuggy, most ST variations deny (1), that God is divine. None are so bold as to voice it in such a 
way, but whatever is divine in the primary sense is a person or a personal being. But God is not a 
person according to ST; indeed, God is the name for a group that is comprised of three divine 
persons. In ST variations generally, and in Moreland and Craig’s variation specifically, the 
persons of the Trinity are divine but not independently God, and the Trinity alone is God but not 
divine. Because, “what is not a person is not divine, not a divinity.”90 Tuggy describes this as the 
“death of ST.” This is true, of course, as any compatible doctrine of the Trinity must conform to 
the Scriptures in which both the Old and New Testament are clear on the divinity of God. 
In an effort to avoid the above-cited pitfalls, some ST proponents may claim that God as 
Trinity truly is a person, in addition to other members that comprise it. Tuggy claims that this 
denies (6)—that anything that is divine is identical to at least one of the following: Father, Son or 
Holy Spirit. In cases like these, we have altogether done away with the idea of the Trinity and 
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have instead affirmed a new Quaternity. This approach would suffice if it were, in fact, a 
scriptural notion. Nonetheless, in the New Testament we encounter only three divine beings with 
no theological recourse to this manufactured fourth.
91
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the development and defense of the ST theory as a viable formulaic 
expression of the Trinity. While social-like Trinitarian models preexisted Plantinga’s initial use 
of the term, Plantinga was the first to give it a formulaic expression. Plantinga offered the 
backdrop of a Barthian model and a LT model (traditional catholic) for his ST theory. Plantinga 
suggested that Barth’s modalism fails because ways or modes simply cannot love each other. 
The LT model, according to Plantinga, champions what it also denies and, thus, is simply a mess. 
Moreover, the LT model can be reduced to the conflation of two disparate modalities, namely 
Johannine theology and neo-platonic philosophy. Plantinga argues that Johannine theology 
expresses the Trinity in a way more akin to community or familial relation, but neo-platonism 
demands an ultimate reduction that forces the community into a oneness where distinction is no 
longer possible. Ostensibly, if ancient thinkers, namely Augustine, had but stuck to the theology 
of the Bible without outward platonic influence, there would be no discussion of the apparent 
problems posed by those in the LT camp. The alternative is something like Plantinga’s ST model 
that sees the Father, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit as members of a family whose oneness is born out 
of relationship, not ontology. 
 C.J.F Williams, who was a British analytical philosopher in the mid and late 20
th
 century, 
suggested that a helpful analogy could be found by looking at certain phenomena that occur in 
the human brain, where after bisection of the brain persons can manifest separate and distinct 
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centers of consciousness. So multiple consciousnesses can seemingly occupy a single body. 
Craig and Moreland suggest that the Trinity could be viewed as something similar to the 
mythological Cerberus, a three headed dog that occupies a single substance. Thus, the Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit may be three distinct persons who are substantially equal. 
The problems with the aforesaid ST reasoning are manifold. Leftow suggested that there 
is a problem of “diminished divinity” wherein the members of the Trinity only share in a 
depreciated divinity and it is in their conjoined coalescence that the members appreciate full 
divine potency. Thus, a theory that is not tritheistic necessitates that the members of the Trinity 
are not themselves God at all. This is a significant problem with respect to the Athanasian Creed 
that very clearly states that the members of the Trinity are God. Plantinga suggests that two 
different meanings of the same word are used by Athanasius in the same stanza. That is, 
Athanasius means “God” as divine in one breath and “God” as “God” in the other. This seems 
remarkably ad hoc. 
There is also the problem of quaternity, where the divinity of three separate and distinct 
members combine to form still a fourth entity, God. If this is, indeed, not a fourth entity, it is 
merely a description, and, thus, God is not a person at all, but merely a description of three other 
persons. Subsequently, as Tuggy suggests, it is hard to imagine how a nonperson could be 
divine. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
MYSTERY AS A VIABLE WAY FORWARD 
Thus far we have discussed the variable shortcomings of the LT theory in its attempt to 
rationally assess the Trinity. It was made clear from Chapter one that any formulaic expression 
of the Trinity must meet the criteria of logical consistency, intelligibility and biblical soundness. 
We have seen while the LT theory has yet to surmount areas of logical consistency, the ST 
theory has foundered on issues of biblical soundness, inasmuch as God as a quaternity or a 
description are simply not biblically defensible positions. Furthermore, it is not clear how Social 
Trinitarians avoid tritheism except by appeal to their own credulity. But if LT theorists cannot 
surmount logical problems of consistency and ST theorists cannot create an intelligible theory 
that reliably avoids Tritheism and other biblical difficulties, what alternative path is available for 
theologians who desire a reliable way to think about God’s triune nature? 
This chapter will survey the possibility of mystery as a reliable way forward.  That is, this 
chapter will discuss Anderson’s thesis on Trinity as mystery and whether it is logically 
consistent, intelligible, and biblically sound. 
 Philip Melanchthon once remarked that the mystery of the Trinity should be adored 
rather than speculated upon, as if somehow the deep profundity of the Trinity is for naught when 
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reduced to the ink of a scholar’s pen—meaning lost in the pursuit of its details.92 Similarly, in a 
tempera painting on a 20 x 38 cm panel, the Italian painter, Sandro Botticelli, depicted a famous 
legend: 
93
 
As the story behind the painting has it, St. Augustine was walking somewhere along the beach at 
Hippo in North Africa. Augustine was struggling to no avail to reason through the mystery of the 
Trinity. As he walked, he came upon a boy carrying water in a bucket back and forth from the 
ocean surf. As it happened, the boy was attempting to fill with ocean water a small hole in the 
sand that he had dug. Struck with insatiable curiosity, not unlike his hunger to unravel the 
mystery of the Trinity, Augustine inquired of the child as to his odd activity. The boy informed 
Augustine that he was attempting to pour the entire ocean into the small hole. Augustine 
responded saying, “That is impossible, for the hole is small and the ocean too huge to fit.” And, 
with great irony, the boy retorted back, “Then how can you expect to fit the mystery of the 
Trinity into that small head of yours?” Incidentally, the boy thereafter disappeared. 
  While mystery in the above story denotes an inability to conceptualize something 
because of its incomprehensible vastness, mystery is not always employed with such meaning. A 
reflection on how the modern use of the term mystery differs from the Greek mysterion 
(μυστήριον) may be helpful in avoiding needless equivocation. In contemporary speech, when 
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we refer to something as mysterious, we tend to mean that such a thing is perhaps marveled at 
but partly or entirely not understood. Merriam-Webster defines mystery as “exciting wonder, 
curiosity, or surprise while baffling efforts to comprehend or identify.”94 In Greek, however, the 
term means something that was a secret to our minds, hidden to us entirely that can only 
thereafter be known if revealed by the god(s).
95
 
 In the Pauline corpus the term μυστήριον (mystery) is firmly connected with 
the kerygma of Christ.
96
  Moreover, Christ is referenced as the μυστήριον of God.97 The 
term μυστήριον does not everywhere in the NT take its content from the Christ revelation, nor is 
it always part of the kerygma. For instance, to fathom the mysteries of God—partake in His 
knowledge—is ostensibly the special spiritual gift of the prophet (1 Cor. 13:2). Similarly, the 
contents of speaking in tongues, another spiritual gift, are also μυστήρια (1 Cor. 14:2), and 
seemingly remain ineffable divine mysteries (or are perhaps mysteries revealed via a translator). 
 Also, according to Günther Bornkamm, a late New Testament scholar who taught at the 
University of Heidelberg, “everywhere in the NT musterion has an eschatological sense.”98 
Bornkamm suggests that in Romans 11:25,  
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Paul unfolds the final destiny of Israel as a specific mystery. In so doing Paul 
disclaims personal cleverness (ἵνα μὴ ἦτε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς φρόνιμοι).” To his own 
intelligence the hardening of Israel would be either a pure enigma or a temptation 
to arbitrary rational conclusions. Putting the historical fact of the obduracy of 
Israel into the context of a μυστήριον, Paul discloses the eschatological 
significance of this event (ἄχρι οὗ … σωθήσεται, 25f.). In the 
present πώρωσις there is intimated in hidden form the entrance of the πλήρωμα 
τῶν ἐθνῶν into salvation history, and hence the final deliverance of Israel too. 99  
 
 Mysterion appears a total of twenty-one times in Paul’s writing and is usually always 
pointing to mystery with reference to its present disclosure (Rom. 16:25-26; 1 Cor. 2:10; Col. 
1:26-27; Eph 1:9; 3:3, 5). Some have argued that 1 Timothy 3:9 is the first time in the NT that 
mysterion has lost what has been described as a characteristically Pauline sense “and describes 
what transcends ordinary comprehension.”100 Even if the meaning of incomprehensibility were 
not contextually true, as P.T. O’Brien, a leading New Testament scholar, argues in his short 
article on mystery, it is the meaning that this paper intends to use for the word “mystery.” 
A Semantic View of Mystery 
 Tuggy, who convincingly argued that the two most favored explications of the Trinity, 
LT and ST, are insufficient with regard to logical or biblical information, also argues that 
appealing to mystery in the modern sense of the word (or the 1 Timothy 3:9 sense) is grossly 
unsatisfactory. Tuggy contends that appealing to mystery in order to avoid facing contradictions 
is rationally absurd.  
 James Anderson of the School of Divinity at the University of Edinburgh takes Tuggy to 
task on this. Anderson added some solid and necessary propositions to Tuggy’s original (1)-(6) 
as was stated in the introduction. With the addition of Anderson’s (7)-(10), sincerely logical 
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theories are simply not to be seen. But Anderson agrees with Tuggy that one cannot really say 
that the Trinity is contradictory, inasmuch as there is nothing particularly amiable about openly 
affirming a contradiction, to say nothing of the fact that you would also bid others to do the 
same. But Anderson makes the distinction between apparent contradictions and real 
contradictions. While it is true that some contradictions may be both apparent and real, there are 
some that Anderson describes as merely apparent contradictions (MAC). He goes on to suggest 
that the only possible option when dealing with the jointly asserted Trinitarian propositions (1)-
(10) is to consider it a MAC. 
 But what does Anderson mean when he asserts that the Trinity is merely an apparent 
contradiction? He suggests, “We should avoid, if at all possible, falling back on the idea that the 
law of non-contradiction does not apply when theorizing about God. Nevertheless, an intelligible 
distinction may be made between apparent contradiction and real contradiction; thus an 
intelligible distinction may be made between apparent-and-real contradiction and apparent-but-
not-real contradiction.
101” 
 There are essentially two claims being made here. First, Anderson seems to be suggesting 
that we should not omit God from the rules of logic like that of the law of non-contradiction, and 
two, that we should also not be so vain as to suggest that our comprehension of God and his 
respective attributes are sharp enough to identify a real contradiction. While our knowledge is 
ostensibly sufficient to know that laws of logic really do totally apply to God and his attributes, it 
is not quite fine enough to know when God or His attributes really do transgress these laws. 
Subsequently, when faced with an apparent contradiction regarding the Trinity, Anderson 
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suggests that we are left to discern the existence of a semantic qualifier. Perhaps something 
within our language merely makes it seem like there is a contradiction.  
 On this point Anderson gives the example of two claims that seem contradictory without 
a contextual framework: 
 (A1)  I am concerned about my wife’s operation 
 (A2)  I am not concerned about my wife’s operation 
 
Without a contextual framework, Anderson is right in saying that these two assertions seem 
diametrically opposed, resulting in what many would consider a blatant contradiction. But what 
we really have here is a Merely Apparent Contradiction Resulting from an Unarticulated 
Equivocation, or what Anderson labels MACRUE. If you knew Anderson, you may trust that he 
is not simply contradicting himself (even if you could not immediately discern why) but that 
there is some unarticulated equivocation on the term “concerned.” Because Anderson actually 
meant that he was concerned inasmuch as he genuinely cares about his wife’s wellbeing and that 
he was not concerned inasmuch as he was not particularly anxious about the outcome. Thus it 
was the spectrum of meaning associated with the single word “concern,” which resulted in an 
apparent contradiction when the joint assertions failed to articulate important nuances.  
 The unfortunate reality of unarticulated equivocations is that it is not always clear how to 
make a distinction. In fact, we may not have sufficient epistemic high ground to purchase 
distinctions at all. But Anderson explains that, “knowing that the relevant distinctions could in 
principle be articulated and explicated is sufficient grounds for distinguishing a MAC from a 
genuine contradiction.”102 
 At this point it seems it would be necessary to add that a distinction must not just be 
possibly articulated and explicated in principle, but that a distinction must have been intended.  
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In the case of Anderson’s two assertions regarding his concern for his wife, a distinction could 
be made, if no variant meaning belied the two separate occurrences of the term “concern,” then a 
genuine contradiction still exists. This contradiction exists then not because two distinctions 
could not be made, but because no distinction was intended. 
 Anderson gives another example of a man, Harry, who listens to a lecture given by a 
continental philosopher. During the duration of the lecture, and due to a combination of sleep 
inducing affairs, Harry finds himself in and out of sleep. At one point before Harry doses off, he 
hears the philosopher suggest that: 
 (B1)  God’s kingdom has arrived. 
 
However, when Harry awakes a second time, he distinctly hears the philosopher claim that: 
  
 (B2) God’s Kingdom has not arrived. 
 
Harry’s initial reaction is that the philosopher must have simply contradicted himself. But upon 
more serious retrospection, Harry considers the fact that an eminent philosopher probably would 
not make so egregious a mistake and considers also his own epistemic limitations resulting from 
his ill-timed slumbering. These things considered, Harry concludes that the philosopher probably 
means that God’s kingdom has arrived in one sense but that it has not arrived in another sense. 
So what seems like a contradiction may only be apparent because of some unarticulated (or in 
Harry’s case, unheard) equivocation. It is also important to note that Harry’s position on the 
eminent philosopher’s MACRUE is not an intellectually unacceptable one. It is important 
because Tuggy suggests that the use of mystery in the face of contradiction is intellectually 
contemptible. It is hard to imagine why it would be better to believe that the eminent philosopher 
genuinely contradicted himself than to believe that his experience of a contradiction is merely an 
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apparent one, resulting, as it were, from some missing semantic equivocation. In fact, intuition 
seems firmly in the favor of the latter.  
 So how do we apply such semantic qualification to our present Trinitarian situation? Is 
there some word that could, in principle, be qualified to allow the Trinitarian formulation to exist 
unencumbered by contradiction? It seems that our ordinary words like “God,” “is,” “divine,” and 
others that do not have univocal meaning could be varied to eliminate formal inconsistency. 
Certainly it could be said that Jesus “is” God in one sense but is not the Father in another sense. 
The only limitations on this enterprise are exegetical ones, insofar as qualifications ought to 
comport to a biblical framework, and semantic commonality. Any given word ought to share 
enough in common with or sufficiently resemble what we ordinarily mean by those words. For 
instance, we cannot simply say that “divine” means what we ordinarily mean by the word in one 
case, and then have it mean “pancake” in another area. We can, however, say that our ordinary 
understanding of some given words is incomplete. This should not be uncomfortable ground for 
Christians, especially for those who concur with Christendom’s adherence to the doctrine of 
analogy, whereby all language about God is finitely analogical. Saying “God is good” is 
tantamount to saying “God” is similar to but not limited by our understanding of “good.”  
 Following this explanation, the precise terms that need to be qualified is a question yet to 
be answered. If the doctrine of the Trinity is, indeed, a MACRUE, then there must be some 
equivocal term that could, in principle, be disambiguated. Anderson identifies some important 
conditions of such words carrying significant analogical meaning: 
Whatever meaning ought to be conveyed by those terms designated as carrying 
analogical senses – ‘is’, ‘divine’, ‘being’, ‘one’, etc. – the terms will be such that 
(i) there remains substantial commonality of meaning with same terms used in 
ordinary discourse and yet (ii) there is diﬀerence of meaning at least in those 
regions where genuine contradiction would otherwise arise with respect to all the 
other things we want to say about God’s nature – most fundamentally, with 
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respect to the things God says about Himself in scripture. Thus, when Christians 
aﬃrm with the Athanasian Creed that ‘there are not three gods but one God’, each 
of the words exhibits substantial similarity (and in some cases identity) of 
meaning with the same word used elsewhere, such that the statement can be 
approximately paraphrased using near-synonyms (e.g. ‘there is not a triple of 
deities but a single deity’); yet there must also be suﬃcient diﬀerentiation of 
meaning that one cannot correctly infer from this statement (in conjunction with 
other biblical data) that God the Father took on ﬂesh and bore our sins. The 
analogous senses of the relevant terms will not permit such a conclusion to be 
deduced; indeed, it is just because the latter proposition is denied by Christians 
that terms are to be considered analogous and not univocal.
103
 
 
While this explanation allows formal inconsistencies in the Trinity to be resolved in a fashion 
more congenial with traditional Christianity, it is a relatively different scenario from the 
examples proffered earlier. The substantial differences are that in the two examples cited above, 
the distinctions that one could make are observable, formally articulated, and are capable of 
being cognitively grasped.
104
 We can understand how one may have concern in one sense yet not 
have concern in another sense. But though we might understand that equivocation could be 
involved in formulations of the Trinity, we are not at present capable of understanding precisely 
in what way or even how the equivocation occurs, a phenomenon referred to by Anderson as a 
“residue of mystery.”105  
Anderson presses forward to explain why it is rationally appropriate to appeal to mystery 
contra Tuggy. He summarizes five definitions of mystery as: 
(1) the New Testament sense, that of ‘a truth formerly unknown’; (2) ‘something 
that we don’t completely understand, something whose entire essence we can’t 
grasp’; (3) some fact that we can’t fully or adequately explain; (4) an 
unintelligible doctrine whose meaning we can’t begin to grasp; and (5) a truth 
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which one ought to believe ‘even though it seems, even after careful reﬂection, to 
be impossible and/or contradictory’ (175–76).106 
 
Anderson believes that we ought to believe the Trinity even though there seems to be a 
contradiction, per the 5
th
 listed definition. But he maintains that the contradiction is merely 
apparent because of “something that we don’t completely understand…,”107 referencing the 2nd 
definition.  
 This does not seem unreasonable, as it has long been established in virtually all realms of 
inquiry that there are things that we believe exist yet do not understand. Christian author and 
apologist, Dan Story, in his book, Defending Your Faith, puts it this way: 
There are many things about the universe we don’t understand today and yet 
accept at face value simply because of the preponderance of evidence supporting 
their existence. The scientific method demands that empirical evidence be 
accepted whether or not science understands why it exists or how it operates. The 
scientific method does not require that all data be explained before it is accepted. 
Contemporary physics, for instance, has discovered an apparent paradox in 
the nature of light. Depending on what kind of test one applies (both of them 
“equally sound”), light appears as either undulatory (wave-like) or corpuscular 
(particle-like). This is a problem. Light particles have mass, while light waves do 
not. How can light have mass and not have it, apparently at the same 
time? Scientists can’t yet explain this phenomenon, but neither do they reject one 
form of light in favor of the other, nor do they reject that light exists at all. 
Instead, they accept what they’ve found based on the evidence and press on.108 
 
Within this proven noetic framework, we can reasonably accept the existence of things we do 
not grasp or even understand at present. Anderson suggests that God’s revelation of himself 
through human language lies at the base of the problem. He states that our language is simply 
not discriminatory enough to provide the distinctions necessary to make our succinct premised 
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formulations internally consistent. This is not because of some deficiency on God’s part but 
rather because of the limitations of language proper. Anderson  believes that “some of our 
intuitive concepts and categories are simply too coarse and indiscriminating to allow us to 
grasp the distinctions that would lay bare, as it were, the metaphysical connections between the 
divine essence and the divine persons.”109  He goes on to say that “God (we may presume) has 
a perfect grasp of these distinctions and hence can see without difficulty just how there is no 
breach of the law of non-contradiction; we must rest satisfied (at least for now) only knowing 
that there is no breach. In a nutshell, the fundamental ‘mystery’ here is one of informational 
limitation rather than logical violation.”110 
 This explanation also seems to comport with Tuggy’s rough criteria for an acceptable 
appeal to mystery: 
First, one must have very strong grounds for believing the claim or claims in 
question. Second, one must have some reason to suspect that the contradiction is 
only apparent. Unless these two conditions are met, one ought not to believe any 
apparent contradiction, for what is apparently contradictory is for that reason 
apparently false.
111
 
 
Of course, as Anderson points out, Tuggy’s second condition would seem to flow seamlessly 
from the fulfillment of the first. If you have good reason for believing a set of independent 
claims, you then would have good reason for believing that the contradiction resulting from the 
joint assertion of those claims is merely apparent. The Christian who takes seriously the 
inspiration of Scripture not only has good reasons for believing biblical claims to be true, he has 
what in many ways would constitute the best reason for believing those claims, God’s very own 
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self-revelation through Scripture. Craig has notably stated the convictions granted Christian 
believers via the Holy Spirit constitute an intrinsic defeater. That is to say any argument that 
seemingly undercuts biblical claims about God (his goodness or even his existence) are 
preemptively defeated by the internal convictions imposed by the enlightenment of the Holy 
Spirit and Scripture. Such convictions significantly weaken the normal proclivity to believe that 
if upon careful reflection a claim appears contradictory, we ought to reject it. Indeed, appeal to 
mystery becomes what Anderson refers to as his RAPT (Rational Affirmation of Paradoxical 
Theology) theory.
112
 
 Furthermore, if there are justificatory grounds in other fields of inquiry to maintain 
apparent contradictions (and in some cases even expect them), we must seriously consider what 
one should come to expect when inquiring into the very nature of the most Supreme Being over 
all of creation. Indeed, Christian tradition has long held to the doctrine of God’s 
incomprehensibility. Certainly it is uncontroversial to suggest that our understanding of God via 
human language is incredibly infinitesimal with respect to God’s self-understanding. Anderson 
summarizes the concept: 
[T]he difference between Creator and creature is of such magnitude that what 
little we do understand of God is but a drop in the ocean compared to God’s self-
understanding. If such is the case (as most Christians would be inclined to grant), 
should we really expect our systematizations of what God has revealed to us 
about Himself by way of limited human language, grounded in immanent 
experience, to be logically perspicuous at every point? Are we justified in 
assuming that our creaturely repertoire of concepts and categories, while perfectly 
adequate for counting peaches and distinguishing postmen from policemen, is 
sufficiently rich and precise as to accommodate every metaphysical nicety 
required to formulate the truth about God’s transcendent nature in an 
unambiguously consistent manner? I strongly suspect not. At the very least, we 
have no grounds for answering affirmatively here; in which case the inference 
from apparent contradiction to real contradiction is undercut.
113
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This line of reasoning is not substantially different from those employed in the philosophy of 
religion to undercut atheological attempts to undermine the existence of God by appealing to 
gratuitous evil. Atheologians utilize methods of inference to conclude that God does not exist. 
Since it seems likely that at least one apparent instance of gratuitous suffering or pointless evil is 
real, it is similarly probable that a God who would by nature prohibit the occurrence of such 
events not exist. 
 What has come to be the most effective retort for dismantling the abovementioned 
atheological objections is the appeal to the true myopia of such inferences. Philosopher Daniel 
Howard-Snyder asks us to consider a similar myopic inference. Imagine I am sitting in my house 
and, looking out my kitchen window at a garden about twenty yards yonder, say to myself, “It 
seems to me that there is no slug in that garden.” Would it be reasonable for me to thereafter 
infer that there is no slug in the garden? No. Or consider this example. Imagine I am listening to 
two seasoned brain surgeons discussing the particulars of a very specific neurological diagnosis. 
With their brobdingnagian medical vernacular, I may say, “it seems to me that what they’re 
saying makes no sense.” Could I reasonably infer, then, that what they are saying actually makes 
no sense? Probably not. 
To state that gratuitous evil exists is to say that there is such a thing as evil that, if 
prevented, would not cause any greater evil or prevent any greater good from transpiring–that is, 
an evil completely absent of a morally sufficient purpose. In order to conclude that such evil is 
probable, it must be concluded that, “the insights attainable by finite, fallible human beings [is] 
as an adequate indication of what is available in the way of reasons to an omniscient, omnipotent 
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being.”114 Howard-Snyder suggests that it “is like supposing that when I am confronted with the 
activity or productions of a master in a field in which I have little expertise, it is reasonable for 
me to draw inferences about the quality of her work just because I ‘don’t get it.’”115 
What good reasons do we have for believing that if such morally sufficient reasons 
existed we would accurately discern them at all? To the contrary, we have good reasons for 
doubting our ability to conclude that since ‘we don’t see ‘em, they ain’t there. 
Similarly, it seems wholly unjustified to think that we sufficiently understand the nature 
of God so as to conclude that the contradictions stemming from formulaic expressions of the 
Trinity result from real inconsistency and not any still unknown equivocation resulting from the 
sheer noetic gap between God’s self-knowledge and our limited epistemic access to God’s 
revealed nature through human language. Consequently, if the reasons for objecting to 
atheological attempts to falsify God via the existence of gratuitous evil are successful, it is not 
clear why similar reasons cannot be used to overcome common Trinitarian objections.  
This is not to affirm the sort of anti-speculative approach affirmed by Thomas a Kempis, 
but rather to acknowlede that our speculations regarding the Trinity are necessarily limited by the 
epistemic access that creatures possess with respect to the creator.
116
 Just as the expected noetic 
gap between creature and creator renders inferences to gratuitous evil unwarranted, it similarly 
reduces inferences to Trinitarian contradictions premature. 
The objection that the Trinitarian contradictions are too explicit to allow an appeal to 
mystery does not withstand scrutiny. It imposes a (assumed rather than proven) univocal 
                                                          
114
 Daniel Howard-Snyder, "On Rowe's Argument from Particular Horrors," in Readings 
in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Kelly Clark(Broadview, 2005), 356. 
 
115
 Ibid. 
 
116
 A.E. McGrath, The Christian Theology Reader (Wiley, 2011), 210. 
63 
 
 
 
meaning on all the words used in formulaic approaches. Furthermore, no explicit contradiction 
exists in the Bible but rather in the joint assertion of the claims that have been inferred from the 
source data. It is not clear why some semantic equivocation, however slight, would not exist in 
our observably finite understanding of God’s self-revelation. 
It seems clear that mystery is an effective way forward when wading through the 
quagmire seemingly inherent within Trinitarian speculation. Both the Latin Trinitarian model 
and the Social model fail to cogently offer descriptions that can overcome scrutiny. Mystery, 
however, allows us to confront the claims of Scripture and remain open to accepting them all, 
irrespective of the seemingly contradictory nature resulting from their joint assertion. Moreover, 
mystery allows Christians to affirm disparate and difficult biblical claims without having to 
sacrifice either rational integrity or biblical foundation.   
But are there any significant problems with this approach? While Anderson asserts that 
we expect seeming contradictions to arise when dealing with the nature of an incomprehensible 
God, Tuggy wonders about the utility of this advice in reality. It is true that we can say, “Jesus 
both knows all” and “Jesus does not know all” and conclude that this is a MACRUE—where the 
word “know” scales in meaning in some epistemically inaccessible way—but both those 
statements really do affect our theological understanding significantly. From this MACRUE, we 
can draw other conclusions such as, “Jesus is ignorant of some facts,” and “Jesus is not ignorant 
of any facts.” If at any point our theological reflections upon these MACRUEs turn to real 
contradiction, we will never know.
117
 Though few instances of MACRUEs even exist in 
theology, most can be easily resolved without appeal to mystery. The above example, for 
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instance, may find theological relief through the expression of Jesus’ hypostatic union, wherein 
Jesus is in possession of two natures, divine and human. The real mystery here is how Jesus is to 
be one hundred percent divine and human, respectively, without confusion.  
 
The Cartesian Option 
 There remains still another approach to mystery that Anderson opposes, namely the idea 
that God may surpass even our most established noetic principles, like the law of non-
contradiction. Almost all philosophers of religion find it intellectually inappropriate to believe 
that it is possible for God to transcend any of the laws of thought, as this would create an infinite 
array of paradoxical questions and a smorgasbord of real impossibilities. Consequently, 
Philosophers assume that God must exist within these laws himself (or by nature be or exude 
these laws).
 118
 
 
Unlike most philosophers, Rene Descartes suggested that intellectual humility in the face 
of so supreme a being may cause us to challenge even our most cherished beliefs. When 
reflecting on God’s omnipotence, Descartes suggested that appeals to logic seeking to disqualify 
omnipotence were ultimately futile, since inherent within the definition of God’s power is the 
ability to defy even the boundaries of logic.
 
Descartes famously stated:
 
I would not even dare to say that God cannot arrange that a mountain should exist  
without a valley, or that one and two should not make three, but I only say that he 
has given me a mind of such a nature that I cannot conceive a mountain without a 
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valley or a sum of one and two which would not be three and so on, and that such 
things imply contradictions in my conception.
119
 
 
This claim, while it permits rather radical implications, is actually quite modest. Descartes claims 
that God may have given us brains such that those things that we cannot conceive as possible 
may be artificial intellectual limitations imposed upon us by God. This claim breaks down into 
three primary points: 
 (1) It is possible that God’s nature exceeds the limits of human conceivability. 
 
This would mean that such things as squared circles, a philosophical go-to when discussing 
logical impossibilities, would not be logically impossible per se, but only impossible according 
to the absolute limit of our conceivability. In other words, logical impossibilities exist only to us 
because God has designed them accordingly. 
 Descartes dissected it similarly: 
It is easy to dispel this difficulty by considering that the power of God cannot 
have any limits, and that our mind is finite and so created as to be able to conceive 
as possible things which God has wished to be in fact possible, but not to be able 
to conceive as possible things which God could have made possible, but which he 
has in fact wished to make impossible. 
 
This would mean that the longstanding theological doctrine of the Trinity may be immune to 
human scrutiny if we take seriously a Cartesian conception of God. The impossibilities we 
encounter when contemplating the Trinity are not a deficiency with the doctrine proper, but with 
the computing power, so to speak, of those who observe the doctrine. C.S. Lewis characterized 
the sort of ineffable nature of the Trinity in this way:  
Now the Christian account of God involves just the same principle. The human 
level is a simple and rather empty level. On the human level one person is one 
being, and any two persons are two separate beings - just as, in two dimensions 
(say on a flat sheet of paper) one square is one figure, and any two squares are 
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two separate figures. On the Divine level you still find personalities; but up there 
you find them combined in new ways which we, who do not live on that level, 
cannot imagine. In God's dimension, so to speak, you find a being who is three 
Persons while remaining one Being, just as a cube is six squares while remaining 
one cube. Of course we cannot fully conceive a Being like that: just as, if we were 
so made that we perceived only two dimensions in space we could never properly 
imagine a cube. But we can get a sort of faint notion of it.
120
 
 
Now it seems clear that Lewis, in defending the cogency of the doctrine of the Trinity, appeals to 
areas outside of our epistemic access. When I refer to something as epistemically accessible, I 
mean that this is something we can know. Similarly, when I say something is epistemically 
inaccessible, I mean that this is something that is inscrutable–completely outside of the area of 
possible knowledge.
121
 
 Lewis’ appeal to areas outside of our epistemic access is seen in his assertion that 
because of our dimensional limitations we simply “cannot imagine” or “fully conceive a Being 
like that.”  
 At this point, it will be helpful to clarify what it is I mean by epistemically accessible. 
Picture a traditional target with a bull’s-eye. Taking the circumference of this target and 
multiplying it by the radius squared will provide the entire value of the target’s surface area. 
Imagine that this finite surface area represents the entire range of possible knowledge; that is, it 
represents the entire field of everything that could ever possibly be known. The bull’s-eye and 
the areas near it represent things we know very well and are, perhaps, very easily known. The 
closer we get to the outer edges of this target, the more difficult, nebulous, and complicated this 
knowledge becomes. Now, outside of this surface target area exists an infinite range of 
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knowledge that is impossible for us to know (at least in this lifetime). This means that things can 
be logically possible, like the existence of another universe where bananas grow on vines, but 
also completely inscrutable, meaning it is completely outside of our ability to conceive.  
This leads to the second point: 
 (2) The Trinity exceeds the limits of human conceivability. 
 
As Lewis pointed out, our limitations are similar to what a two-dimensional being may 
experience when dealing with three-dimensional concepts. (P1) and (P2) then, culminate 
inevitably in the following claim: 
 (3) The Trinity is possible. 
 
If it is merely possible that God’s nature exceeds the absolute limits of human conceivability, 
then the Trinity may get a philosophical pass, insofar as we can accept all of its separate 
assertions as true without worrying how those assertions operate in unity. (2) is relatively 
uncontroversial from a LT perspective. (3) follows logically from the joint assertion of the two 
prior points. Indeed, the argument seems to hinge unilaterally upon (1). Subsequently, if it can be 
shown that we have at least some basis for believing (1), then it is hard to see why the Cartesian 
option for Trinitarian hypothesizing is not a valid alternative meta-theory to Anderson’s model. 
 One could build a substantial and persuasive case by drawing upon the Sentience 
Quotient concept introduced in the late 1970s by Robert A. Freitas, Jr. Sentience Quotient (SQ) 
is a way of measuring the efficiency of an individual brain or computing force. One need only 
provide good reasons for demonstrating the possibility of a significant SQ disparity between an 
immaterial being not bound by physical limitations and human beings (who have a SQ of +13). 
If a disparity of such magnitude did exist, then we, earnestly wondering how God could be 
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triune, would not be relatively different than a plant wondering how to square the sum of two 
numbers.
122
 
 Another angle from which to approach the viability of Cartesian reasoning lies in the 
scientifically undisputed manifest problems associated with traumatic brain injury or mental 
disorders and deficiencies. While the inability to think abstractly can be caused by various 
conditions arising from damage to certain neural structures, there are some conditions that render 
it impossible for a person to conceive of certain concepts. For instance, Anosognosia is a 
condition that impedes a person’s self-awareness, making it impossible for them to become 
aware of any disability they possess. If a person has a stroke and loses the ability to move some 
portion of his body, he may make any number of excuses for why he is not moving that portion. 
These excuses range from insisting that he does not want to move the affected parts to suggesting 
that the particular portion of his body is, in fact, not his body. This is not denial, a well-known 
psychological defense mechanism, but rather a full-fledged inability to become self-aware of a 
disability he or she possesses.
123
 Consider, too, Dyscalculia, which some cognitive psychologists 
explain as a fundamental inability to conceive of numbers as abstract entities, which encumbers 
comprehension of even the most basic arithmetic.
124
 Because of such a disorder, a person may be 
completely unable to discern which of two numbers is larger than the other.
125
 This inability to 
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conceive does not mean that such tasks are impossible, even though it seems that way to the 
person experiencing it, but rather belies a fundamental cognitive deficiency with respect to the 
person attempting the comparison. 
 Therefore, the existence of Ansognosia, Dyscalculia, and other brain-related conditions in 
fact bolsters the Cartesian case. If there are documented and well-understood cases where human 
brains demonstrate an incapability of conceiving certain phenomena or of thinking abstractly (the 
most complex state of cognitive thinking), then certainly it could be possible that there is a 
global, all-encompassing human incapability of conceiving the full spectrum of possibility that 
governs God’s Trinity. Moreover, it is possible that what we perceive as impossible may be the 
outcome of our inability to fathom higher order truths of the kind to which God would be privy. 
 By way of another analogy, let us tweak Lewis’ dimensional example.  Imagine that there 
exists a divine being known as Cube. Cube is a conscious geometrical shape who is omnipotent. 
Furthermore, imagine that Cube decides to do something incredible before you. Cube takes you 
and resolves to create a universe comprised of only two dimensions right before your eyes. So 
Cube speaks and out of nothing a two dimensional universe is created and populated with 
intelligent life. Within this universe, there is height and there is width but there is no depth. The 
universe that Cube has created does not represent the absolute boundaries of Cube but rather is 
comprised of the absolute boundaries of those who occupy it. But Cube is a benevolent creator 
who wishes to make himself known to the intelligent beings of his creation. So Cube 
communicates to them saying, “I am the one and only creator of all that you know.” The beings 
of his creation are ecstatic and worship Cube, their creator. Cube does not wish to stop there, 
however. Indeed, he wishes to meet his creation. Cube tells his creation that, “I wish to come 
before you and reveal myself to you.” But how could this be possible? How do you communicate 
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the geometric nature of a cube within a two dimensional plane? You cannot. In fact, according to 
the inhabitants of Cube’s manufactured universe, it is logically impossible for any three-
dimensional object to occupy only two dimensions. The inability to conceive of such a being as 
Cube, however, does not necessitate its nonexistence. Instead, Cube manifests himself in a way 
accessible to the inhabitants. Before the eyes of one creature, Cube touches just the point of one 
of his corners (vertex) to the two dimensional plane. Still again in front of another creature, Cube 
touches just his edge to the plane. Lastly, in view of yet another creature, Cube touches his plane 
surface on the two dimensional space.  
 As a result of this manifestation, one creature saw Cube a dot, while another perceived 
Cube as a line segment, and lastly, another experienced Cube as a square. The creatures began to 
dispute how Cube could possibly be these three different things yet still be only one Cube. On a 
two dimensional plane it is logically absurd, simply impossible, for Cube to be those three 
separate things and still be the one and only creator. Cube insists that “my ways are higher than 
your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.” But how does Cube explain that in addition to 
height and width he also has something called depth. Depth is so completely foreign and, as it 
happens, epistemically inaccessible to those who occupy only two dimensions that its utterance 
would be incomprehensible. 
 This picture demonstrates the practical utility of mystery when working to understand the 
nature of the being who created everything. It need only be logically possible that the created 
beings simply do not have access to the categories necessary to describe the complexity of Cube, 
their creator. Just as two dimensional beings would be bereft of categories to describe three 
dimensional complexities, so we too may lack categories sufficient for understanding the 
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complexity of God.
126
 This analogy is not unlike Anderson’s example, wherein occupants of a 
two dimensional Flatland grapple with the reality of a three dimensional cone. The idea that 
something can be both a circle and a triangle simultaneously would be inconceivable when 
operating within a framework that lacks depth. It is, therefore, perfectly logical for us to imagine 
circumstances where beings of limited epistemic capacity would conceive as logically 
impossible states of affairs that are actually possible given the introduction of some epistemically 
inaccessible reality. Ironically, Anderson’s own analogy, similar to the Lewisian one, seems to 
allow for the possibility of God to actually transcend some of our cherished laws of thought.  
 In fact, this version of mystery is significantly different than the type that Anderson 
espouses. Anderson posits mystery on a semantic level, where there is some sort of semantic 
equivocation happening with one or more of the words used to discuss the Trinity. For instance, 
“is” or “one” or some other word used in the articulation of the Trinity carries some mysterious 
(unknown) denotation that allows for all the statements (1)-(10) to be true independently and 
without contradiction when jointly asserted. For Anderson, mystery takes place on the level 
governing our knowledge of the full semantic spectrum. The Cartesian mystery, on the other 
hand, allows for mystery to take place on the level governing our knowledge of even the most 
fundamental laws of thought. It literally challenges our ability to claim for ourselves an 
epistemic superiority that is capable of knowing, for certain (in the non-Cartesian sense), when 
something is impossible. Cartesian mystery does not state that we should believe that God is 
contradictory, but rather we should believe that it is possible for God to exceed the boundaries of 
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knowledge that ordinarily allow for us to determine contradictions. Consequently, the logical 
impossibilities we encounter because of some incumbent contradiction may result from the laws 
we use to form contradictions, which, in fact, represent an artificial limitation on what is actually 
possible. 
 This view does not escape criticism. For instance, some contradictions are so clear that it 
seems frankly awkward to think that the contradiction is not real but merely arises because we 
lack access to some crucial epistemic category. Plantinga would say that when one sentence is 
clearly denied by the next, we have little recourse to mystery because the contradiction is clear. 
Subsequently, contradictions that arise out of the present information and could not be said to be 
the result of too little information should be denied or clarified. And is not the Latin Trinity just 
one of these types of contradictions, where it is said that God is Three Gods and One God 
simultaneously? Does not the LT model affirm what it also denies?  
 I think that it does. But the Cartesian option allows the affirmation of contradictions of 
this sort. This is a philosophically uncomfortable position. Reflect, though, for a moment on 
Anderson’s flatland analogy. Occupants of such a reality would be forced, in many respects, to 
affirm what is to them a logical impossibility. They would be asked to affirm the reality of two 
independent geometric shapes, circle and triangle, and then be asked to affirm a reality where 
both circle and triangle are, in fact, one geometrical entity. While the name of this ostensibly 
single geometry is labeled ‘cone,’ its label does nothing to change the fact that in two dimensions 
it is simply not possible for a circle and triangle to exist as one. So the phrase, “a cone is a 
circular shape and a triangular shape, but there are not two shapes but one,” is an example, in 
flatland, of a phrase that affirms what it also denies. Given our vantage point, however, we know 
that through the introduction of depth, what is logically impossible given the epistemic 
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categories of the occupants of flatland, encounters no resistance in three dimensional reality. 
Therefore, it is not clear that we can simply deny LT variations because they affirm what they 
also deny when we have conceivable examples where the introduction of an important epistemic 
category eliminates the problem. The Cartesian option operates under a framework that affirms 
that what we conceive as possible and impossible, respectively, is based on what God has 
decided we should conceive as possible and impossible, and does not represent absolute limits. 
 Some may accuse the Cartesian option of producing a mystery pandemic, insofar as such 
open logical borders with respect to God eliminate human ability to theologize. For instance, the 
necessity of the redemption narrative becomes cumbersome to explain if we cannot omit the 
possibility of God’s doing logically impossible things. Why did Jesus have to die? Why do all 
sin and fall short of the glory of God? The appeal to human freedom becomes less clear when we 
have no recourse to claim that God cannot do what we conceive as logically impossible.  
 I confess that such a criticism seems true. But it is not entirely clear that it should matter. 
The Bible seems universally concerned about faith and not our ability to comprehend the 
necessity of any given theological doctrine. In fact, if the authority of the biblical witness is 
enough to compel theologians to believe in the Trinity despite its epistemic difficulties, it is not 
clear why theologians should not adopt a similar stance with regard to the entirety of the biblical 
witness, where we see that redemption is necessary, regardless of whether or not we understand 
the reasoning behind it. This sort of Cartesian mystery is not a destruction of the utility of reason, 
but rather a sort of Babel toppling, where an attempt to reach for the heavens resulted in the 
realization that not everything can be known. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Where then does this leave us? The fuller points of the Trinity were born out of various 
responses to Patripassianism and Sabellianism in the early 3
rd
 century by Tertullian and 
Hippolytus of Rome, who wrote Against Praxeas and Against Noetus, respectively. These early 
expository treatments of Trinitarian theology began the historical process of well-articulated 
Trinitarian theorizing, where writings against Monarchianism and Modalism continued to 
explore and express Trinitarian theology. Over the years of early Trinitarian theorizing, many 
Trinitarian statements became commonplace and accepted as biblically sound. These statements 
took authoritative expression in the edicts of the Council of Nicaea in AD 325 and even fuller 
expression in the later Athanasian Creed. The premises in the introduction (1)–(10) are taken as 
the Trinitarian statements widely accepted by most theologians. These premises again are: 
(1) God is divine. 
(2) The Father of Jesus Christ is divine. 
(3) The Son, Jesus Christ, is divine. 
(4) The Holy Spirit is divine. 
(5a) These three are numerically distinct: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
(6) Whatever is divine is identical to at least one of these: the Father, the Son, or the Holy 
Spirit. 
(7) The Father of Jesus Christ is identical to God. 
(8) The Son, Jesus Christ, is identical to God. 
(9) The Holy Spirit is identical to God. 
(10) There is one divine being. 
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What this paper has demonstrated is that modern attempts to analytically dissect the Trinity fail 
on fundamental levels of biblical inaccuracy and logical inconsistency. Those in the LT camp, 
the more traditional approach to the Trinity, have failed to create a cogent case for the Trinity 
that does not run afoul with the traditional laws of thought. For how could the Son and the Father 
be the same God but not the same person? This contradiction has led many in the LT camp to 
fudge identity, saying there must be something called relative identity, whereby absolute identity 
does not exist. Instead, any entity A may be the same as B relative to C.  
 Such relative identity theories have only replaced one mystery with another, however, 
inasmuch as it is not at all clear, or even intelligible, how relative identity could possibly replace 
absolute identity. Moreover, the examples that LT adherents do use, like Michelangelo’s David 
sculpture, where relative identity can be established between the statue and the marble, offer 
conceptual differences only, not ontological ones. That is to say a statue is really not anything at 
all, it is only a conceptual understanding regarding the shape of something else. 
 More uniquely, Leftow sought to clarify an LT doctrine of the Trinity by analogy of three 
time traveling dancers. If it is logically possible for one being to travel back twice to the same 
moment, there could theoretically be three instantiations of the same entity. These instantiations 
would share the same “trope” of divinity, but would still be separate and distinct persons (at least 
now). Leftow recognized the philosophical shortcomings of time travel proper and thus 
suggested that it need only be logically possible (not physically possible) because God is not 
bound by the limitations of current physics. Leftow sought to show why the following argument 
is invalid: 
1. The Father = God 
2. The Son = God 
3. God = God 
4. The Father = The Son 
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The problem, of course, is that 1-3 are demanded by orthodoxy but 4, implied by 1-3, is 
necessarily unorthodox. Consequently, Leftow essentially changed 1-3 to be something other 
than absolute identity statements (though he did not state this). Instead, he posited, 
[I]t is because God always lives His life in three discrete strands at once, no event 
of His life occurring in more than one strand and no strand succeeding another. In 
one strand, God lives the Father’s life, in one the Son’s, and in one the Spirit’s. 
The events of each strand add up to the life of a Person. The lives of the Persons 
add up to the life God lives as the three Persons. There is one God, but He is 
many in the events of His life.
127
 
 
In the argument that Leftow sought to invalidate, cited earlier, he has actually modified 1-2 to 
state that  
 
1'. The Father is God living fatherly in one strand of life 
2'. The Son is God living sonishly in another strand of life 
 
The issue here is that it suffers from a Modalistic problem. These distinctions are not substantive 
but only adjectival, meaning that these separate strands of God’s life are not properly persons but 
are simply events or modes of God. 
 An inability to make clear substantive Trinitarian distinctions while staying within the 
confines of logic has caused many theologians and philosophers to take a different avenue. The 
ST route, where God is explained primarily as three before one, describes the persons of the 
Trinity as unique individuated self-consciousnesses who are bound into unity by something 
similar to a family. Plantinga is notable for first giving this view full explication, when he 
compares the ST view with the LT view (traditional catholic view) and Barth’s Modalism. 
 Plantinga suggests that we are compelled by threat of incoherence to accept that the 
Athanasian Creed is utilizing the same word “God” to mean two different things. When the 
author of the creed says, “[(14)] So the Father is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Ghost is 
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God. [(15)] And yet they are not three Gods; but one God,” he must be employing “God” in a 
different sense in (14) than he is in (15). Though this approach strains credulity, it is ostensibly a 
better alternative than incoherency. 
 In another attempt to defend the ST view, Craig and Moreland look at the mythical 
Cerberus and Bicephalic animals as a way of drawing a ST analogy. They argue that there are 
examples where a single individuated being is comprised of two separate and distinct 
consciousnesses. Similarly, God could be one divine substance and yet comprised of three self-
consciousnesses.  
 It has been convincingly argued, however, that the ST view has several significant 
problems. For instance, Leftow argued that this theory effects a sort of diminishing divinity, 
whereby the individual persons of the Trinity are only quasi-divine, inasmuch as the fullness of 
divinity is only truly expressed when all three together comprise the Trinity. Similarly, just as 
Plantinga criticized Barth’s theory on account of modes of being not being able to exist in loving 
relationship with each other, it is hard to see how this theory escapes similar shortcomings. 
Given that nothing is identical to one of its parts, and based on the fact that the Trinity is 
composed of three separate and distinct parts (or persons), we must then be committed to (5b), 
that is, the belief that God is numerically distinct from Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Thus, we 
have a quaternity. The alternative would be to downgrade the claim and maintain that God is 
merely the name of the Trinity composition. But, as Tuggy argued, what is not a person is not 
divine. And what is not divine is not God. 
 The varied attempts to construct a Trinity theory that is not laden with significant biblical 
or rational pitfalls are, at present, unsatisfactory, or as Tuggy maintained, unfinished. The 
alternative is to embrace again the position of mystery with which our forebears seemed 
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perfectly content. In his own reworking of a mystery hypothesis, Anderson claimed that mystery 
cannot account for contradiction, inasmuch as the contradiction is merely apparent, arising from 
some unarticulated equivocation. Thus, mystery is precisely the unarticulated. We do not know 
precisely where equivocation takes place along the semantic way, so to speak, but experience 
grants us the recourse to suggest that it is possible for us to lack the ability to conceive the full 
expression of God’s revealed nature. This approach is analogous to falling asleep during a 
lecture and waking only find that the two sections heard seem contradictory.  
 This paper has suggested that Anderson’s approach works, but this paper also suggested 
that the application of mystery can be taken further. The Cartesian alternative makes the modest 
claim that it is possible that God exists in a way that defies our epistemic range. Descartes 
believed that God could bring about a state of affairs that, to us, seems contradictory. We may 
plant our feet in the philosophical ground and claim, as Plantinga does, that the dignified title of 
mystery is ill placed, as it is really just a nonsensical mess. Nonetheless, readily apparent and 
verifiable examples of ailments that impede human ability to conceive of logically possible 
things do exist, why would we assume that it is not possible for a similar phenomenon to affect 
all of humanity? That is to say, what would drive us to conclude that it is not possible for God to 
exceed the absolute limits of our imagination? God’s complexity may exceed conceivability. 
Certainly no one ever claimed that Christianity was not a bit messy. Furthermore, if we have no 
problems understanding how and why a two-dimensional intelligent being would have trouble 
comprehending the complexities of three-dimensional space, why would we believe ourselves so 
privileged as to be fully capable of knowing the ways of God? For it was God himself who said, 
“I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the cleverness of the clever I will set aside.” 128 
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